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ABSTRACT 
In the Western Cape, snoek (Thyrsites atun) is a target for small scale fisheries. This fishery is 
comprised of recreational, subsistence and traditional line fisheries in the province. Snoek 
contributes 40% to 50% of the line fish which is landed. This thesis sought to identify the roles 
which are performed by informal snoek traders in certain Cape Town coloured1 townships in the 
snoek value chain. 
There are various aspects of this fish which heightens its importance in the Western Cape. Snoek 
is significant in the provision of food security for many poor and working class individuals and 
households within the coloured townships of Cape Town. Snoek is an omega 3-rich fish and is 
one of the Cape’s most well-known gastronomic traditions. It provides affordable and easily 
absorbable proteins, vitamins and minerals for township people. Poor people mostly rely on 
starches and fail to afford the most expensive protein sources like red meat. The snoek trade also 
helps in the creation of jobs and enables people to earn cash income.  
The study revealed that there is specialisation and division of labour between snoek traders and 
fishers. Snoek is sold via the auction system at the various landing zones scattered all over the 
Western Cape. It was observed that the snoek value chain is dominated by men and there are few 
women in the value chain who sell or clean snoek. Informal snoek traders ply their business next 
to shops or on the sides of busy roads using ‘bakkies’2 from where the fish is flayed and sold to 
the waiting customer to emphasise its freshness. Snoek traders create convenience by bringing 
fresh fish to customers in the townships. They also assume risks which come with venturing in 
business. Some snoek traders engage in multiple livelihood strategies by diversifying income 
generating activities rather than relying on one income source. Among the several challenges 
which snoek traders confront, one pressing challenge they need to address is their lack of 
organisation which prohibits them from speaking with one voice.  The snoek value chain should 
be more efficient so that it keeps supplying the much needed nutrients in the townships. .Both 
primary and secondary data collection techniques were used. Snoek traders face a myriad of 
                                                  
1 The term “coloured” in South Africa refers to the population of historically “mixed-race” largely Afrikaans-speaking 
inhabitants of large parts of the Western Cape Province (Norton: 2013). 
2 An Afrikaans word meaning a small vehicle with an open part at the back in which goods can be transported. 
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challenges which require the authorities to address. They have no access to infrastructure with 
sanitary facilities. The other problem they face is that they are disorganised amongst themselves 
which weaken their cause. Traders and fishers would like to see the real transformation taking 
place within this snoek fishery. Traders are convinced that there is corruption within the fisheries 
department and many have lost faith in the system. 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Introduction 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) predicts that global fishery 
production from wild capture fisheries and aquaculture is projected to set a new record in 2013 at 
160 million tonnes, up from 157 million tonnes the previous year, while exports will reach $136 
billion (FAO, 2014). Fish is therefore the most valuable agricultural commodity traded 
internationally and increasing each year (FAO 2007, Nieland 2006, HLPE 2014). The fish trade 
contributes to a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), creates livelihoods and provides food 
security (FAO, 2014). For the developing countries net fish exports have grown from US$ 27.7 
billion in 2010 to US$ 35.1 billion in 2012 (HLPE  2014). This sector therefore contributes 
significantly to the livelihoods and socio economic well-being of fisherfolk the world over 
(Johnson 2006, Tall 2001). The FAO (2010) estimates that about 45 million people are employed 
in both capture and aquaculture fisheries. Indications are that fish production and employment 
within the sector is expanding (HLPE 2014, Weeratunge and Snyder  2009).  
 
The benefits from the fish trade do not stop with the fisher or trader (Johnson 2013). Fishing 
activities reverberate within the economy causing a host of positive changes both upstream and 
downstream for the community through the multiplier effect. The multiplier effect will result in 
other jobs being created as a result of fishers and traders’ activities (Johnson 2013). Globally, 
downstream industries employ a further 135 million people within post harvest and 
manufacturing of fish and fish products because of the multiplier effect FAO (2012). With the 
income earned from selling fish, traders buy various goods and services to meet their family 
needs. The demand by traders known as “derived demand” for such commodities helps create 
jobs in those sectors. Studies tend to point to the fact that local agricultural employment and 
income multipliers accrue within the localities which are trading in agricultural produce (Allison 
2011, Gordon et al. 2011). Multipliers become strong if traders spend most of the income locally. 
A study by the Sustainable Livelihoods Fisheries Project in Ghana found that one fishing job 
created seven additional livelihoods while the FAO suggests that for every person employed 
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directly in fishing, there may be an additional 4 associated downstream jobs (Gordon et al, 2011: 
16).  
Small-scale fisheries have been seen to be very important in livelihoods and food security in 
coastal communities (Gallardo 2008). Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) account for more than half of 
the total fish production in the world (Diei-Ouadi and Mgawe 2011). They employ 95% of men 
and women engaged in this sector and more than 90% of those operate in developing countries 
(FAO 2007). Within the West African community for example, the artisanal sector is an 
important source of employment and foreign exchange and consistently provides about 40% of 
animal protein to the region's growing population (Tall 2001).   
 
1.2. Fish and food security  
Fish provides affordable and easily absorbable and highly digestible proteins, vitamins and 
minerals for many poor rural people (Olufayo 2012). Fish provides high quality animal protein 
which is essential for the development and functioning of healthy nervous systems. Fish contains 
all essential amino acids, especially those such as lysine that are low in other protein sources; 
lipids, especially the omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids required for brain development and 
function and energy- and vitamin-rich oils; and micronutrients (vitamins and minerals; especially 
calcium, iodine, iron, phosphorus, zinc, and Vitamins A, B1, B2 and D) (Pullin 2013). This is 
particularly true for the poor who mostly rely on starches and cannot afford to buy the more 
expensive protein sources (Cheke 2012, Allison 2011). In most cases in developing countries, 
fish caught from small scale fisheries is more affordable than beef, mutton and pork. Small scale 
fisheries make a contribution to the economic development of a country (FAO 2012). 
 
1.3. Fisheries and the Western Cape 
Employment is the crucial livelihood strategy in the Western Cape, particularly in the fishing 
sector (catching and processing), farming, manufacturing and retail industries, port and tourism 
related service industries (Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998:  9). In the Western Cape the 
fishing industry is estimated to contribute 0.2% to the gross geographic product (GGP) for the 
province (WWF 2011). The economic value of the recreational and commercial fishery was 
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estimated from expenditures on fishing trips and income earned by commercial operators and 
crew. When multiplier effects are taken into account, fisheries are estimated to contribute 1.3% 
of the gross geographic product (GGP) of the coastal provinces, and generate employment for 
131 500 people (McGrath et al. 1997). Shore-angling was found to be most 
significant, contributing 76% of the GGP attributable to the fishery (McGrath et al. 1997). 
Fisheries are central in the social economy of the Western Cape where entire coastal 
communities depend directly or indirectly on fishing for their livelihood (Sumaila et al. 2002). 
According to Global Insight (2013), fishing and the operation of fish farms contribute 0.41% 
(approximately R605 million) to Cape Town’s GDP and 0.3% (or R2, 916m) of Cape 
Town’s formally employed total (Court 2013 per comm.). These figures, however, only capture 
the total value of the primary sector operations of this industry, namely the fishing and farming, 
and fail to take into account the broader value chain.  This value chain includes the processing 
and salting of fish, packaging and retailing. These figures also do not take into account informal 
fishing activity (like the snoek trade) as this is not factored into the GDP.  As such, the figures 
probably substantially underrate the industry in terms of its absolute value.  The industry share of 
GDP though does provide some degree of insight.  For instance, the fishing industry has a larger 
(0.41%) GDP share than agriculture (0.37%) within Cape Town (Court 2013 pers comm). 
1.4. Snoek 
Snoek or Cape Snoek (Thyrsites atun) is a predatory fish which thrives within the Benguela 
ecosystem (Griffiths 2002), which stretches from Angola to South Africa. Snoek is mostly sold 
by ‘langanas’3 by the quay or road side (Hara 2014). For those langanas who ply their trade in 
bakkies (of which they are the majority) they park their cars by the roadside or near busy 
shopping centres waiting for customers. Most of their selling spots are known by their customers.  
 
These traders assume risk by buying snoek to sell as they invest resources into the business. 
They are the intermediaries between the fisher and the consumer. They buy fresh fish from the 
fishers and convey it to the township residents and in the process address the nutritional needs of 
                                                  
3 ‘Langana’ is a traditional and historical Afrikaans name for township snoek sellers, which has was used by Cape slaves in the 
1700s (Isaacs 2013, Hara: 2014). 
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the working class and poor residents within the south eastern suburbs of Cape Town. Traders 
therefore help with food security to the target market. Snoek traders are an important step 
towards poverty alleviation in the sense that their activities create employment, amongst other 
benefits. The trade in snoek also has positive impacts for both upstream and downstream 
activities within the value chain. This is the concept of the multiplier effect where activities 
pursued by snoek traders will have positive impacts on other value chain players like fishers, 
skippers, their families as well as others players who rely on snoek traders as their customers.  
 
1.4.1. Why is snoek important to us?  
Snoek traders and fishers earn a living from their activities and are able to fend for their families. 
Informal snoek traders earn income from their activities and are able to enjoy higher living 
standards for themselves and their families. The activities of fishers and traders also provide food 
security within the low income areas in which they operate. Snoek is a source of protein for the 
poor and working class people in Cape Town. Snoek is an omega 3-rich fish and is one of the 
Cape’s most well-known culinary traditions (Isaacs 2013). In many African countries fish 
consumption is an important source of protein, contributing 22% of overall protein intake (DFID 
2006). Snoek roe (eggs) is also a popular delicacy within the communities of the south eastern 
suburbs in Cape Town. Snoek is eaten mostly by the coloured people of the Western Cape. Many 
South Africans, especially those from Cape Town, refer to snoek as the classic Cape ‘braai’4 
favourite, as a fish that must be tried when one visits the city (Norton 2013).  
 
Traders deliver fresh fish for the convenience of their customers, from distant landing sites to the 
coloured townships. Snoek is a target for artisanal and small scale fishers (although a significant 
amount is caught as by catch by demersal trawlers. Snoek fisheries are a low earning sector but a 
labour intensive type of fishing which means that most of the fishers can be classified as poor 
(Mann et al. 2000, McGrath et al. 1997). The line fishery sector employs 27% of all fishers but 
has the lowest average employment income of all South African fisheries (Branch and Clark 
                                                  
4 ‘Braai’ is an Afrikaans word for barbecue. 
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2006). On the other hand, the trawling sector (consisting of trawling companies like Irvin & 
Johnson, Viking, Foodcorp, Pioneer, Sea Harvest to name just but a few) pays salaries that are 
substantially better than most other fishing activities, with a mode of R35 000 per annum 
compared to about R12 000 per annum per person for traditional line fisheries (Branch and Clark 
2006).  
1.4.2. Snoek consumption 
Snoek is eaten mostly by the low income members within the coloured community within the 
south eastern townships of Cape Town. The reason for this trend can be traced back to the days 
of the occupation of the Cape Colony in the 1600s and the 1800s (Isaacs 2013, Salo 2007). 
Snoek became a delicacy for slaves from West Africa and Muslim political prisoners who were 
taken from Indonesia and the Philippines and it was also an important food source for many poor 
families within the Cape Colony (Isaacs 2013). Salo (2007) documents that snoek was turned 
into a commodity for export to Mauritius as a reliable and cheap food for slaves working in the 
sugar plantations which had been seized from French colonists. Ironically, the cultural stigma of 
snoek as slave food has helped it survive as a contemporary staple for dispossessed agricultural 
and industrial workers living around metropolitan Cape Town (Salo 2007). Another reason why 
snoek is looked down upon by some sections of society is the claim that it has large densely 
packed bones which make it very difficult to eat (Norton 2013). And yet another claim is that 
snoek is full of globules of fat and parasitic worms which scares off the supposedly health 
conscious consumer (New Zealand Herald 2012). In Cape Town, big retailers like Woolworths, 
Shoprite, Pick ‘n Pay and Snoekies in Lansdowne Road in Philippi do not stock locally caught 
snoek species because it is argued that the fish is not available in huge and reliable quantities. As 
a result, a substantial amount of snoek which is stocked in several retail chains is imported from 
New Zealand and Australia (Isaacs 2013).   
 
1.5. Rationale and significance of the research 
The snoek trade creates employment opportunities, lessens poverty and supplies food to the 
impoverished communities of Cape Town. In terms of poverty alleviation, this assumes at least 
two dimensions, namely poverty reduction and poverty prevention. Poverty reduction includes 
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earning income at household level, contributing to the country’s GDP and contributing to taxes. 
The concept of poverty prevention looks at how people stay out of or not fall further into poverty 
by providing a minimum standard of living and a safety net function (BNP 2008). Snoek is a 
well known fish in Cape Town and provides food security to working class people and the poor 
coloured communities to the south east of the city. Fish provides food security at all levels of 
society (HLPE 2014, Pullin 2013). In the Western Cape, snoek is the mainstay of line fishery and 
yet there has been little research focusing solely on snoek traders and fishers in this part of the 
world.  
 
The 1996 World Food Summit defined food security as a situation when all people, at all times, 
have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences to lead an active and healthy life (Allison 2011, BNP 2008, FAO 2005). It was 
therefore felt that an investigation into the social and economic players within the snoek value 
chain needed to be done to get insights into the way snoek traders run their business operations. 
Studying the operations of snoek traders was also expected to identify constraints and 
opportunities inherent within the snoek value chain in an attempt to make the value chain reduce 
bottlenecks and make it more efficient. This study draws from theoretical underpinnings of the 
interactive governance framework, value chains, the informal sector, multiple livelihood 
strategies and gender studies. For instance, how does the interactive governance framework 
apply to players within the snoek value chain? The interactive governance framework places 
importance on solving societal problems and creating opportunities by generating interaction 
between civil, public and private persons and organizations (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). The 
Western Cape Provincial Government acknowledges that there is little doubt that informal 
traders in the right governance, institutional and macro-economic climate context can generate 
rent and contribute to local economic growth (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). Issues of governance 
and institutions play a pivotal role in improving the living standards and contributions of 
informal fish traders and fishers to the gross geographic product (GGP) of the Western Cape 
Province. Appropriate governance and proper institutional arrangements in a country like 
Norway appear to have made their fisheries sector contribute meaningfully to the country’s 
economy (Béné et al. 2010a).  
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In most fishing communities, apart from dealing with fish, the fishing communities embark on 
multiple livelihood activities as coping mechanisms against unfavourable conditions. Studies 
done elsewhere show that fishing communities pursue multiple livelihood strategies (Chiwaula et 
al. 2012, Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Udong 2011). This aspect 
helps us identify coping measures which are adopted by traders against stresses and shocks 
within the fisheries value chains, the economic system and the environment. An understanding of 
the fishery sector and the characteristics of the households and communities is essential for 
sound policies and interventions to improve the sector and to strengthen the role fisheries can 
play in enhancing food security and alleviating poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Béné et al. 
2010b).  
 
The informal economy and value chains were also considered to be important aspects of this 
study deserving special mention. Concepts on the informal economy and value chains would 
provide us with the background required to appreciate the operations of the snoek traders. 
Analysing value chains helps us identify the various players, their functions and existing 
linkages; determine value increasing opportunities; assess the input-output structure and we are 
also able to analyse the limitations and opportunities intrinsic in the value chain (Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2001). Value chain analysis also allows for an understanding of the snoek value chain and 
would be very important because this can contribute to the development of livelihood 
interventions since it exposes the constraints and opportunities (Campbell 2012, Gordon et al 
2011, Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, Timmers 2012). It is widely believed that improved value 
chain governance will contribute to the more efficient transfer of fish to the market providing 
higher margins for fishers and traders as well as improved leverage for steering the industry 
towards sustainable production (Loc et al. 2010). Furthermore, improvements of fish value 
chains will improve the resilience of fishing households not only by enhancing the value but also 
by reducing the variation in income between good years and bad years due to unstable 
ecosystems (Chiwaula et al. 2012). From the statistics available, line fisheries in South Africa are 
valued at R2.2 billion annually of which snoek is the most important of the species caught 
comprising about 40% of line fish which is landed (DAFF 2012a, Griffiths 2002). Thousands of 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
people are employed within the snoek value chain - ranging from skippers to fishers and traders.  
Other players benefiting indirectly include bait dealers, gas stations and fishing gear 
manufactures. The full extent of the economic contribution created within the snoek value chain 
is potentially a subject of another research.  
 
Undertaking this study required the scrutiny of the operations of langanas starting with the 
source of fish, transportation to the market, processing (if it was done) and selling the fish.  
This research was also viewed as having the potential to contribute to the design of appropriate 
intervention policies and procedures which could result in empowering informal snoek traders 
and fishers as well as establishing a framework of sustainable livelihoods and livelihood security 
for the traders and their households as we move along the snoek value chain. The interactive 
governance framework contends that the state, community and NGOs should come together and 
equally decide on the rules of the game in a given situation to motivate fishers and make them 
abide by the rules since they will also own the programme (Hauck 2008, Jentoft  2013). It is 
argued that if such arrangements are put in place, poaching and deviancy are likely to be 
minimised. 
1.6. Research Objectives  
The objective of this study is to identify the roles which are played by informal traders within the 
snoek value chain in Cape Town. Informal snoek traders are part of the SSF community in the 
Western Cape since they form the link between fishers and consumers by distributing fish 
coming from small scale traditional line fisheries to the market.  Informal traders in the snoek 
value chain operate within governance structures which are intricately linked to issues like 
gender, multiple livelihoods and power relations. As a result, these concepts are examined in 
order to get a deeper understanding of how they apply to the snoek trade. The analysis of value 
chains allowed the identification of opportunities and constraints which may be inherent in the 
snoek value chain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
The research problem can be summarised thus: 
To investigate the roles played by snoek traders in terms of livelihoods, gender dimensions, 
governance frameworks and the informal trading sector in Cape Town’s south eastern townships 
and to establish the nature of their relationship with snoek fishers within the snoek value chain.  
It is from this research problem that research questions were generated.  
1.6.1 Research questions 
This research attempted to answer the following research questions: 
i. What is the current role of informal snoek traders in food security, employment 
creation and other aspects and how can that role be enhanced within the snoek 
value chain? 
ii. What governance framework is in place within the traditional line fishery sector? 
iii. How do gender dynamics, power relations and multiple livelihoods apply in the 
snoek trade?  
Informal snoek traders’ activities are crucial in the townships where they operate. Virtually every 
Cape Town inhabitant knows about snoek and langanas. The fish has strong traditions in the 
Western Cape. This study therefore focused on the informal snoek traders plying their trade in 
the south eastern townships of Cape Town, South Africa. Its aim was to acquire information on 
various roles which are played by snoek traders who work within the dominion of small scale 
fishers. This chapter looks at the way information on snoek traders was collected in an attempt to 
answer the research questions which are indicated earlier in this thesis.  
1.7. Methodology 
Both primary and secondary methods of data collection were used in this study. Both methods 
harmonize each other if they are used circumspectly. A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative and primary and secondary research is known as triangulation or methodological 
pluralism (Holtzhausen 2001). Triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that 
diverse viewpoints or standpoints provide clarity on a given topic (Olsen 2004). This approach is 
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advantageous because it allows us to cross check our results. The main methods of data 
collection were participant observations, interviews and secondary source analysis. This study 
integrates information which was obtained from key informants, face to face interviews and 
observations which were made while snoek traders were serving customers (including cutting 
and packing the fish). The fieldwork was conducted by interviewing and observing both traders 
and fishers interacting at one landing site. 
1.8. Primary data collection  
Face to face interviews and observation were used to collect primary data from various role 
players who included fishers, traders and other informants, namely Department of Agriculture 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Irvin & Johnson 
personnel. Although the focus was on traders, it was relevant to interview fishers as well to get 
the whole picture on the nature of the relationship which exists between the two groups. This 
was done in order to get a deeper understanding of the relationship between snoek traders and 
fishers. This made it possible to gain insight into the power relations existing between the two 
groups. An interview guide was designed for traders, fishers and informants. The interview guide 
(semi-structured interviews) was able to get information on snoek harvest statistics, landing 
zones, background of traders, sources of snoek, how fish was procured and sold, governance and 
the whole process of running the snoek trading business. Interviews were carried out in situ at 
spots where traders sold fish. Interviews and observations were also done at St Helena Bay when 
snoek was auctioned in the West Coast. Interviews with officials from WWF, DAFF and Irvin & 
Johnson were conducted at their places of work. On average each interview lasted 30 to 45 
minutes. While interviewing traders who work as a group on one bakkie, they all would take part 
in the discussion and would consult and complement each other to show the true state of affairs.   
1.8.1. Key informants  
Six organisations provided informants, namely the City of Cape Town, DAFF, WWF SASSI, 
Irvin & Johnson and Snoek Wholesalers at Lansdowne and Becker Roads, Philippi. The 
researcher visited the offices of the WWF and the DAFF to talk to selected personnel. 
Discussions were also conducted with two senior employees at the Irvin & Johnson head office 
in Woodstock, Cape Town. The Snoek Wholesalers branch manager in Lansdowne was 
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interviewed on the premises as well. Another two individuals were interviewed at the WWF 
SASSI offices in Newlands.  
1.8.2. Interviews  
Interviews with snoek traders were unscheduled owing to the nature of their modus operandi 
since they sell their merchandise from the back of bakkies and are highly mobile. Some usual 
selling points were seen to be abandoned mainly because of the unavailability of stock. The 
statistics relating to the numbers and background of interviewees are shown in Table 1 below. 
Traders were interviewed within the townships, from where they conducted business. 
Table 1: Number of stakeholders interviewed 
Organisation Number interviewed 
Department of Fisheries 3 
Snoek Wholesalers, Lansdowne Street 1 
Irvin & Johnson 2 
Snoek Traders 20 
Fishers 4 
WWF SASSI 2 
Total  32 
 
1.8.3. Observations of snoek traders 
According to Kawulich (2005), observation research provides researchers with ways to check for 
the non-verbal expression of feelings, and determine who interacts with whom, grasp how 
participants communicate with each other, and check for how much time is spent on various 
activities. Observations may help the researcher have a better understanding of the context and 
phenomenon under study. Observations were used so that concrete descriptions of how fish is 
flaked and sold could be obtained. In her study of Ibaka women fish traders in Nigeria, Udong 
(2011: 123), argues that observation as a research technique is used, “…to get a better grasp on 
processes of livelihood generation…the way the fish market works, both at the beach and the 
village market”. Visits were conducted to the stalls and spots where snoek was sold. Traders 
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were observed whilst they went about their business. Typically a bakkie with snoek will have the 
fish stacked at the back with the door open. The open bakkie door is used as a platform on which 
to cut the fish. A small mat or cutting board will be placed on top of the open door to absorb 
shock against direct blows onto the metal door from the butcher’s knife. The fish is cut across its 
length. Once cut, it is opened and its insides (roe and intestines) are removed. A butcher’s knife 
is then used to chop the fish bones into small pieces (without dismembering the pieces which are 
left loosely hanging). This requires a certain level of exactitude which can only be accumulated 
with experience. Sometimes customers can request the roe and the heads from the fish that have 
been cut for them or they leave them altogether. Old newspapers are used as packaging material. 
The uncollected roe and heads are sold to other deserving not so well to do customers.  
On some bakkies, there will be two or three different sized piles of fish where fish from each 
respective heap commands a different fish price, with the bigger fish costing more. Customers 
are given the privilege to select what they judge to be the biggest and the best amongst other fish. 
The practice is that the fish which has been chosen is cut while the customer would be waiting, 
to emphasise its freshness and to make the customer feel satisfied since fresh snoek is regarded 
highly in this part of the world.  
Observation as a research method was also done at St Helena Bay when boats came from fishing 
with snoek. Snoek was sold using the auction system with the highest bidder getting the fish. On 
the day the observation of the auction was done, the minimum asking starting price for each fish 
was R23. Once a deal is struck, the buyer (or a group of buyers) is obliged to buy all the fish on 
the boat. Deals were struck at prices above R23 which averaged around R27 per fish. Traders 
quickly loaded the fish and drove off. Observation as a technique was used to obtain information 
on how fish is acquired at the beach, processed, and sold to the final consumers in the townships. 
As a result, insights were obtained on how the fish market works, both at the beach and the 
townships.  
1.8.4. Case Studies  
Case studies were used to obtain qualitative data on how fishers and traders interact in terms of 
their social and livelihood behaviours. Several case studies were consulted of articles written by 
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a wide array of authors. There are multiple definitions and understanding of what constitutes 
case studies (Benbasat et al. 1987, Yin 2014, Zucker 2009). George and Bennett (2004:5) argue 
that, “The case study approach is a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to 
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” Case studies 
are generally strong precisely where statistical methods and formal models are weak (George and 
Bennett 2004). A major feature of the case study methodology is that different methods are 
combined with the purpose of illuminating a case from different angles, to triangulate by 
combining methodologies (Johansson 2003). Case studies offer the advantage that one does not 
need to visit the area under study as data or information will be obtained by simply consulting 
secondary sources. Yin (2014, 1998) views a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a phenomenon within its real-life context. The case study approach is useful where contextual 
situations of the events being studied are very critical and where the researcher is unable to 
control the events as they take place (Yin 2014).  It is against this background that the case study 
approach was used in this thesis, drawing on case studies that were conducted on fish traders and 
fishers in West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, the Pacific, Latin America 
and South East Asia.  
1.8.5. Overview of the study areas  
The Western Cape of South Africa is the province where most snoek is sold by informal traders. 
Most of such transactions are done from bakkies by the road sides. The trade takes place within 
the townships in an area broadly known as the Cape Flats5 to the south east of the city of Cape 
Town. Townships which were included in the study are Athlone, Delft, Eerste River, Mitchell’s 
Plain, Hanover Park, Strandfontein, and Manenberg. Hout Bay to the south west of Cape Town 
was also covered. See, Fig 1 for details. 
                                                  
5 The ‘Cape Flats’ is an expansive, low-lying, flat area situated to the southeast of the central business district of 
Cape Town. 
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Figure 1: The townships included in this study. 
Source: J. Hall 
 
Due to South Africa’s history and the legacy of apartheid through the Group Areas Act (Mabin 
1990) these townships have coloured people as the dominant population group. Trade in snoek is 
common in these areas such that this fish is viewed by many as a historical and cultural food 
exclusive to the local inhabitants. Unlike other fish species, snoek is the only fish which has a 
flourishing substantial informal market in Cape Town where it is mostly sold in coloured 
communities (Martin and Nielsen 1996).  
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1.8.6. Challenges met 
Sometimes it was difficult to locate snoek traders at the usual market places especially those 
roving with bakkies. Some designated selling spots were abandoned due to fish unavailability. 
This required that the interviewer would have to return to the spots in subsequent days until there 
were traders to interface with. Other traders felt uncomfortable with the interviewer as they 
viewed him as wasting their time. Some traders mistrusted the interviewer. They tried to hide 
information on how much income they were realising per day and feared that the interviewer 
might have been a state agent collecting information for taxation purposes. But, on the whole 
traders cooperated fully with the research which was conducted. Some traders had expectations 
that they would get help in funding as a result of the research as they thought that the interviewer 
was a government employee. Nevertheless, it was made abundantly clear to them that this was 
purely an academic undertaking.  
 
1.9. Secondary data collection   
For the most part, secondary data collection entailed the scrutiny of relevant literature. Most of 
the literature review was based on literature assembled through internet searches. A considerable 
amount of literature came from the WorldFish Center, FAO, DAFF and CGIAR. The literature 
review was used to understand various theoretical concepts which were relevant to this study. 
Several concepts were examined to gain deeper understanding of the way langanas operate. Such 
notions included, but were not limited to: interactive governance framework, informal sector, 
gender dimensions in selling fish, multiple livelihood framework and value chains. Documents 
which were accessed include reports, books, articles and newspapers. Both published and 
unpublished articles were used. Some documents provided case studies which were used to 
obtain information on how other fish traders and fishers interact and function in their respective 
communities. A review of essays and articles was undertaken to compare and contrast the 
functions of snoek traders in the Western Cape to those of other fish traders in other parts of the 
world. Several Master’s and PhD theses from other students were consulted. The author was at 
pains to use current literature to make the study up to date with recent developments.  
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1.10. Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 1 gives the introduction, context and background to the problem area and its relevance to 
research. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework relied upon to come up with this study. 
Chapter 3 talks through the methodology which was used to collect data as well as the 
delimitation which was done. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results that came out of this 
study. Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations based on the results of this 
research. 
1.11. Chapter Summary 
This chapter shows that fisheries are crucial to the economy of the western especially if we take 
into account the broader economic ramifications. Thousands of people earn their living from 
activities within and related to the fisheries sector. The sector also generates income which is 
critical for the employees and their dependants. The snoek has been shown to comprising the 
biggest percentage of all the line fish which is caught in the traditional line sector. As a result the 
management and governance of this fish should be in such a way that it does not interfere 
negatively on the way snoek players derive from it. As has been highlighted fish contributes 
widely to the GDP of respective countries in terms of earning cash income, creating employment 
and establishment of food security. Looking at snoek it is noted that the fish is mainly consumed 
by poor and working class people in certain coloured townships. Snoek is part of the traditional 
line fishery. This fishery contributes more than R2, 2 billion to the national economy. By 
inference, snoek is estimated to contribute at least 40% of that revenue. The chapter also looked 
at the conceptual framework which is relevant to this study. The concepts are applied to the 
study contracting and comparing with other studies done on informal traders elsewhere.  
The chapter also examined the research objectives and methodology which were used in this 
study. The study used triangulation as a research method combining both primary and secondary 
research methods. This is aimed at making up for the weaknesses of either of the methods. 
Primary methodology was used by used of interviews and observations while secondary 
methodology employed the used of published literature and case studies. The next chapter looks 
at snoek within the South African context.  
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CHAPTER 2: SNOEK IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FISHERIES CONTEXT 
2.1. Introduction 
The coastline of South Africa is estimated to range from 2 500 to 3 000 kilometres long 
(Griffiths 2000, IAEA 2014) and is characterised by a wide variety of marine life. It is estimated 
that South Africa has around 147 fishing communities, 28 338 fisher households and about 29 
233 people who are considered true subsistence fishers while 100 000 people are employed in 
fishery-related enterprises (DAFF 2010a). South Africa’s formal commercial fishing industry 
employs approximately 43 458 people, including those employed seasonally and permanently 
(DAFF 2010a). About 90% of all South African fish landings are done on the Western Cape 
harbours (Martin and Nielsen 1996, DAFF 2010a). However this figure excludes those employed 
within the informal sector. Incidentally, most of the snoek traded falls within the ambits of the 
informal economy. Statistics which relate to informal snoek traders are difficult to get hold of 
and this presents a challenge for scientists seeking to have an insight into the extent and impact 
of the snoek trade. It is estimated that line fishery of which snoek is the mainstay, is worth about 
R 2.2 billion per year for the four South African coastal provinces of Northern Cape, Western 
Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal (Hara 2014, Isaacs  2013, McGrath et al. 1997). 
2.2. Small scale fisheries 
The term Small Scale Fisheries (SSFs) is used widely in many circles. It may be problematic to 
get an acceptable definition of what constitutes SSFs (Andrew and Evans 2009).  What may be 
considered as small-scale in one place can be seen as large scale in another country. The BNP 
(2008:  5) states that:  
Still, there are some general attributes that relate to the broad definition of scale; 
large‐scale – or industrial fisheries – are often associated with high capital costs and 
sophisticated technologies; small‐scale fishing is perceived as using smaller craft, and 
more labour intensive and low‐technology fishing methods. 
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Snoek fishers are viewed as small scale and artisanal since they use handlines when catching 
fish. Griffiths (2000) argues that line fishery boat sizes range from 5.5 to 15 m in length. In 
Mozambique, semi-industrial fishing uses vessels with intermediate lengths of between ten to 
twenty metres, driven by engine and may use ice on board for fish preservation and catch fish 
using methods like bottom trawl, pair trawling, gillnet dropline or handline (Momade 2005). 
Unless otherwise stated, in this thesis the terms ‘fisheries’ or ‘fishers’ are used to make implicit 
reference to artisanal fisheries and the small-scale operations and modus operandi of those 
relying on them (Brugère et al. 2008). However, the snoek fishers use fairly more sophisticated 
equipment as compared to other small scale fishing communities in Africa. In most parts of the 
world small scale fishers may not afford the acquisition of such equipment like powered boats 
since they make use of rudimentary methods and implements which include dugout canoes, 
spears and mosquito nets.  
 
On a good fishing trip when snoek runs are intense, snoek fishers can land as much as 1500 to 
2000 fish per day (Croome 2013 pers. comm.). Even though, this quantity can be seen as 
infinitesimal when compared to the tens of thousands of tonnes that are harvested by large trawl 
companies whose boats are equipped with refrigeration facilities and can stay at sea for several 
months on a typical fishing trip. Snoek fishers and informal traders therefore fall within the 
category of SSFs due to the scale of activity they conduct in their business.  
2.3.  Line fishery 
Line fishing is defined as a fishing method whereby fish are harvested using a hook and line but 
excludes the use of set longlines (DAFF 2012a, Mann et al. 2000). Snoek is caught using 
handlines. Line fishing embraces subsistence, commercial and recreational line fishing, the latter 
often being referred to as angling (Mann et al. 2000, Statistics South Africa 2012). Subsistence 
line fishing generally consists of poor people living within walking distance of the resource, they 
fish from the shore using low technology gear and the fish caught are generally used for their 
own consumption, while a surplus may be sold locally. Commercial line fishing catches fish for 
sale while recreational fishing occurs when fishers go to fish for fun and as a past-time.  
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Recreational fishers may release their catch or they may take it home. Together, the three sectors 
of the line fishery (commercial, recreational and subsistence) target between 95 and 200 of South 
Africa’s 2 200 marine fish species DAFF (2012a). Apart from snoek, line fishers also catch other 
fish species like Giant trevally (Caranx ignobilis), yellow tail (Seriola lalandi), red roman 
(Chrysoblephus laticeps), black marlin (Makaira indica), Dusky kob (Argyrosomus japonicas), 
‘haarder’, commonly known as harder-southern mullet (Liza richardsonnii), maarsbanker 
(Trachurus delagoa), Hottentot (Pachymetopon blochii) and panga (Pterogymnus laniarius) 
(West and Marsac  2013, Attwood and Bennett  1995). Line fishing takes place from Port 
Nolloth in the Northern Cape on the West Coast, to Richards Bay in KwaZulu-Natal on the 
South West (Croome 2013, DEAT 2005). This area is divided into three Zones namely A, B and 
C (DAFF 2010b). Snoek is caught within Zone A. The fishing method is exceptionally 
traditional in nature with fisher families having participated, in many instances, for generations 
and centuries and is characterised by insecure labour relations (DEAT 2005). When fishing for 
snoek, skippers employ fishers on an ad hoc basis. Snoek fishers do not have employment 
benefits like leave days and provident fund. The origins of such exploitation can be traced back 
to the 1940s when the South African Sea Products company became a fishing monopoly on the 
Hout Valley when workers were forced to work for one large fishing company and the 
dependency relationships between labour and capital were uniformly extended to the entire 
workforce in the valley (van Sittert 1985).  
Commercial line fishing along the South African coastline comprises about 3 000 boats and 
provides a livelihood for an estimated 25 000 people spread along the entire South African coast 
(Mann et al. 2000). However, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 
states that in the late 1990s the total number of registered vessels was estimated to be at 700 of 
which 37% of all boats were operating in marine fisheries in South Africa. But as of 2012, 455 
boats were in operation (DAFF 2012b). And yet still, Griffiths (2000) argues that the Cape 
commercial line fishery consists of about 2 500 vessels (which are 5.5-15 m long), which operate 
on the continental shelf (5 -130 m depth) between the Orange and Kei Rivers (coastline length of 
2500 km) using handline or rod-and-reel (Griffiths 2000). Most line fish caught is not 
exclusively target of this fishery but form important components of the catch or by-catch of other 
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fisheries. This complicates the management of this resource. Commercial line fishery is 
considered to be a low earning but labour intensive industry which is important from a human 
livelihood point of view. The line fishery as a whole, excluding the estuarine sector, is estimated 
to provide employment for approximately 130 000 people, and to contribute about R 2.2 billion 
annually to the economies of the four coastal provinces - Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Northern Cape and Western Cape (DAFF  2012b, McGrath et al. 1997).  
2.4. Brief snoek biology 
Snoek (Thyrsites atun) is a long, thin, commercial food fish belonging to the snake mackerel 
family (Norton 2013). It used to be known as the “zee snoek” by the Dutch settlers in the 1600s 
(Isaacs 2013, Nakamura and Parin 1993). It is also known as the Cape Snoek and thrives in the 
temperate waters of the Southern Hemisphere. In Southern Africa it occurs within the Benguela 
Ecosystem (Griffiths 2002). It is found near continental shelves or around islands and feeds on 
crustaceans, cephalopods and small fish like anchovy and pilchard. Snoek is found from the top 
water to the sea bed to depths of 550 metres and forms schools near the bottom of mid-water and 
prefers water temperatures of between 13 °C (55 °F) and 18 °C (64 °F) (Nakamura and Parin  
1993). The Benguela Current Ecosystem as a system can be loosely considered as covering the 
continental shelf between the Angola-Benguela frontal zone in northern Namibia/Southern 
Angola and the Agulhas retroflection area (Hampton et al. 2003). The occurrence of snoek 
within this ecosystem stretches from southern Angola right through Namibia to   Mossel Bay in 
South Africa (Hampton et al. 2003). However, some authors argue that the Thyrsites atun have 
been recorded from northern Angola to Algoa Bay on the South African east coast but are mostly 
found between the Cunene River and Cape Agulhas, i.e. in the Benguela ecosystem (Griffiths 
2002, Mann et al. 2000). South African snoek fishers indicated that they fish snoek within the 
stretch from Lamberts Bay, about 280 kilometres to the north of Cape Town and Arniston 
Village which is some 190 kilometres to the south east of Cape Town.   Thyrsites atun also 
flourishes in other continents. It is also found off Tristan da Cunha in the mid southern Atlantic, 
off Western Australia and New Zealand, where it is known as barracouta (which should not be 
confused with the game fish barracuda) and the east and west coasts of Southern America (Chile 
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and Argentina) where it is called the sierra and the islands of Amsterdam and St. Paul (Griffiths 
2003). Fig 2 shows the distribution of snoek the world over. 
 
Figure 2: The global range and proliferation of Thyrsites atun (shown in red) 
Source: FAO Fact Sheet, 2014 
 
The body of snoek is dark blue, slightly paler on the belly; the first dorsal fin membrane is black 
(Nakamura and Parin 1993). 
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Snoek displayed for sale along Robert Sobukwe Road, Bellville. Source: P Mubaiwa.  
Snoek are a large predatory, pelagic schooling species whose movement is highly unpredictable 
depending on seasons (Hampton et al. 2003). The seasonal migrations of this fish are known as 
“snoek runs”. The snoek run is seen as “…a moment in which a communal spirit of place, in all 
its incarnations, is performed,” (Norton 2013, 4). Snoek are a resilient and fast-growing species 
with the South African snoek population attaining 50% sexual maturity at a fork length of 
ca.73.0 cm in 3 years (Griffiths et al. 2002, Mann 2000). The fish spawns off-shore in 
winter/spring (Griffiths 2002). The unpredictable movement of snoek makes them less 
vulnerable to overfishing. The  DAFF uses various stock indicators including the catch per unit 
of effort (CPUE) to assess the status of line fish and snoek, which is said to be 40-50% optimally 
exploited (Hara  2014).  
2.5.  Snoek catches over the years 
Snoek is a lively creature which is historically, culturally, economically, and ecologically active 
in the Western Cape (Isaacs 2013, Norton 2013). Snoek is a well-known species and is the 
mainstay of line fisheries in the Western Cape, comprising more than 40% of the line fish that is 
landed (DAFF 2012b, Isaacs 2013, Mann et al. 2000. However, Isaacs (2013) argues that line 
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fishery accounts for more than 50% of line fishery which is landed. Thyrsites atun has been a 
commercial species since the early 1800s mostly caught with hand lines although trawling has 
been used after 1960 with a total catch peaking to 81 000 metric tons in 1978 (Griffiths 2002). 
Annual catches for 1991-95 were between 14,437 tonnes and 22,920 tonnes, and 93% of it was 
in South African waters (Nakamura and Parin: 1993). Thyrsites atun is also targeted by 
recreational fishers whose statistics are difficult to get. While the Australian and New Zealand 
snoek stock has been studied extensively, the life history of the South African snoek has been 
difficult to obtain because of relatively few studies done on it despite its importance in socio-
economic and ecological terms in the Western Cape (Griffiths 2002). 
 
Snoek is also caught as by-catch in both the inshore and offshore demersal large scale 6trawl 
fisheries. By-catch refers to fish which is caught accidentally by trawling companies while 
targeting different fish species. Trawling vessels for example, occasionally catch snoek as by-
catch when their target would be hake. The by-catch of the trawl fishery is approximately 10 000 
metric tonnes landed per year (Mann et al. 2000). Looking at the statistics, the average catch per 
boat increased from 4,669 tonnes in the period 1897 – 1906, then to 5,999 tonnes for the period 
1927 -1931 and declined to 3,454 tonnes in the years 1986 to 1998 per year. The snoek catch in 
2000 was 74% of the period 1897 – 1906, and 56% of that of the period 1927 -1931. The 
fluctuations over the three periods indicate that snoek has not depleted (Mann et al. 2000). 
 
Most of the snoek which is caught in South Africa’s West Coast is transported to the Cape Town 
metropolitan and other peri-urban areas (Isaacs and Hara 2007) where it is sold fresh. In South 
Africa, snoek is mostly caught from a stretch running from Lamberts Bay to Arniston within the 
Western Cape coastal area (Croome pers. comm. 2013). However, it is mainly eaten by coloured 
people in the south eastern coastal parts of Cape Town (Isaacs 2013) commonly known as the 
Cape Flats.  
 
                                                  
6 This is also known as the hake sector and makes use of big boats which can stay at sea for weeks, freezing the 
catch at sea. 
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Despite its importance, a considerable amount of barracouta is imported into South Africa from 
New Zealand and sold in some supermarket chains as South African snoek. It is estimated that 
about 100 tonnes of frozen barracouta is from New Zealand per annum (Isaacs  2013) while 
another estimate puts the amounts of barracouta imports at 5 000 tonnes (Hara  2014). However, 
South Africa's snoek and New Zealand's barracouta are the same species. Referring to 
barracouta as “snoek” can erroneously be construed to mean that it was caught within South 
African waters. Being a “traditionally and culturally important” part of South Africa since the 
1600s, “snoek” should be a local, trademarked product name that can only be used for fish 
caught in local waters, much the same as Champagne refers only to sparkling wine from the 
Champagne region in France (Isaacs 2013). When snoek fishers were interviewed on what they 
thought of the matter they also said that barracouta should be properly labelled and identified 
(Norton 2013). 
 
These imports are viewed as impacting negatively on the locally caught snoek as well as on the 
livelihoods of the fisherfolk which depend on this fish (Isaacs 2013, Hara 2014). Pursuing that 
trajectory, it can also be the inferred that in the absence of imports, incomes earned from the 
trade in locally harvested snoek in all probability, would be higher than what is the case at 
present as local consumers would only buy locally caught fish. In principle, this would transform 
to higher living standards for local fishers and traders. Little is known of snoek as a researched 
species (Griffiths 2003) since most surveys favour certain fish species for studies, in particular 
valuable commercial fish species. This has led to little understanding of fish of less commercial 
value. It is ideal that all fish species should be studied so that they can be managed and 
understood better in terms of conservation regardless of their commercial status (Nashima 2009). 
2.6.  Snoek catches and trends in South Africa 
There are differing arguments on which sector lands more snoek, the line fishery or the trawling 
sector. From the statistics available, (see Fig 3 below), there seems to be a non-conclusive 
answer to this conjecture. For the period 2001 to 2007, the trawl sector landed more snoek than 
the traditional line fishery. However, this pattern tends to change as from 2008 to 2012, where 
according to the statistics, line fishers landed a higher percentage of snoek than the trawling 
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commercial sector. It is also unfortunate that the Fisheries Handbooks do not have snoek catch 
statistics for line fishery for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012. They also have omissions for mid-
water trawl (which is part of the trawling sector statistics) catches for the period 2001 to 2009. 
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Figure 3: Snoek catches for the period 2001 to 2012 (in tonnes) 
Source: Information obtained from Hara, 2014; and Fisheries Handbooks 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013.  
Some authors however, argue that approximately 40% of the South African snoek catch for the 
period 1990 to 1996 was made by traditional hand line fishermen while trawlers accounted for 
60% (Griffiths et al. 2002, Mann 2013). This may not be an accurate assessment as the 
commercial line-catch may be under-reported by as much as 75% (McGrath et al. 1997, Isaacs 
2013). Information gathered indicates that it is not easy to quantify accurately the value of snoek 
which is landed and most line caught fish goes to informal traders including some of the trawlers 
when sold as fresh (Handley 2013, pers. comm.). Boat owners who employ line fishers use 
fishing permits on the basis of the total allowable effort (TAE) to catch snoek whilst trawling 
companies supposedly get snoek as by-catch. The law allows the trawling sector to land snoek as 
long as they do so within their quota allocations (Peeha, pers. comm.  2013). For some reason, 
snoek catches fluctuate from year to year. The variation is determined by factors such as water 
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conditions, the extent of snoek movement and the availability of nutrients within the Benguela 
ecosystem. For some unknown reasons, in many parts of the world, some fishing periods are 
simply better than others in terms of fish size and quantity (Handley 2013, pers. comm., NORAD 
FAO Project 2012, Udong et al. 2009).  
2.7.  Governance within the snoek value chain 
Like in all other marine and coastal resources, governance within snoek fisheries is guided by the 
DAFF as it is the authority which issues fishing rights and permits to fishers. According to the 
DAFF, snoek fishery falls under traditional line fishery (DAFF 2010b). Under this, fishery 
permits are issued through the Director for Inshore Fisheries Management. Permits are issued 
subject to the provisions and regulations of various Acts of Parliament which include the Marine 
Living Resources Act (1998), the National Environment Management Act (1998), National 
Environment Management  Biodiversity Act (2004) to name just a few (DAFF 2010b). The 
Director has powers to amend the permit conditions after consulting with permit holders and 
relevant recognised business bodies. For most part, permit conditions outline the responsibilities 
of holders like the disposal of waste at sea, the total allowable effort, which fish products to 
harvest and how permits can be transferred to other individuals. Traditional line fishery permit 
holders are required by law to submit catch statistics which are recorded in the ‘blue book’ 
(DAFF 2010b). Failure to adhere to the permit conditions may lead to legal proceedings being 
instituted against transgressors. The DAFF uses Regional Management Areas and has established 
zones where respective permits are required to operate within demarcated zones. The zones are 
identified as Zone A, which runs from Port Nolloth to Cape Infanta, Zone B Cape Infanta to 
Cape St John’s and Zone C which is KwaZulu-Natal (DAFF 2010b). Each permit is valid in only 
one zone and does not overlap onto other zones. Apart from the above, permit holders are 
required to adhere to vessel specifications in terms of boat sizes which are in tandem with their 
permits. Permit holders are required to pay levies as determined by the DAFF.  
 
The DAFF regulations also specify fish species which are prohibited from being caught. For 
those fish species that can be caught, regulations specify the fish size to be landed and the bag 
limit. For the Cape Snoek, the minimum size that is allowed to be landed is 60 centimetres which 
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is measured in a straight line from the tip of the snout to the extreme end of the tail (DAFF 
2010b). Snoek does not have bag limits as it is regarded as being exploited optimally. Traditional 
line fishers have designated landing bays. They are prohibited from using any other landing 
zones apart from those indicated on their permit conditions.  
The researcher believes that permit conditions should be administered cautiously. In coming up 
with such rules and regulations, it is in everyone’s interest for government to involve the civic 
society organisations, private citizens and fishing communities in pursuance to the system of 
belief of the interactive governance framework. The emphasis is for transparency in the eyes of 
all stakeholders so that regulations are drawn up collectively for them to be morally binding for 
all. There was dissent in the Western Cape in January 2014 when the DAFF released the names 
of small scale fishers who had been allocated fishing rights for the traditional line fishery. 
Several seasoned fishers had been left off the list, to their disappointment. After traditional line 
fishing rights expired on New Year's Eve in 2013, fishermen were required by law to re-apply. 
When the allocation process was done, the South African Commercial Linefish 
Association (SACLA) cried foul and claimed that it was fraught with irregularities. According to 
the Association chairperson, Wally Croome, of the 303 of their members who re-applied, only 
115 were successful. As a result, SACLA took government to court over what they perceived to 
be a process which was fraught with irregularities and with a gross lack of lucidity in the 
allocation of fishing rights. The court ruled in favour of the SACLA and the then Minister of the 
DAFF, Tina Joemat-Pettersson was forced to set aside the original allocations to pave the way 
for an independent audit. Those fishers who had lost their rights were given a reprieve by the 
court to keep on fishing until certain clarifications were to be made by the DAFF. Some other 
fishing associations were up in arms, claiming their livelihoods were also at risk (Eye Witness 
News 2014). 
2.8.  Chapter summary 
This chapter shows that fisheries are crucial to the economy of the Western Cape, especially if 
we take into account the broader economic ramifications. Thousands of people earn their living 
from activities related to the fisheries sector. The sector also generates income which is critical 
for the employees and their dependants. Snoek has been shown to comprise the biggest 
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percentage of all the line fish which is caught in the traditional line fisheries sector. As a result, 
the management and governance of this fish should be in such a way that it does not interfere 
negatively on the way snoek players derive livelihoods from it. The next chapter will examine 
the literature review which was conducted to come up with a framework to analyse snoek 
traders’ operations.  
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter looks at the conceptual framework which was relied on in order to identify the roles 
played by informal snoek traders in Cape Town. It is very important to understand the theoretical 
underpinnings that govern the activities of small scale fishers and informal fish trading in 
general. In this respect six theoretical frameworks were examined. The examination involved 
analysing the concepts interactive fisheries governance theory, the informal sector (informal 
economy), multiple livelihoods framework, gender relations, and power relations. This is 
represented in Fig 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The conceptual framework of this study. 
Such a multi-faceted approach is of significance since it allows this study to be placed 
contextually against other studies done before it and in other parts of the world. This has several 
advantages. Firstly, such an approach makes it convenient to identify the dynamics, roles and 
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functions of fish traders. Secondly, it affords the opportunity for us to grasp the basics on how 
the informal sector operates as well as the main pillars of value chain analysis. Thirdly, it would 
be possible to make comparisons across the spectrum of informal fish traders from other parts of 
the world and then juxtapose findings to those of Cape Town snoek traders. The literature review 
makes it possible to unpack theoretical concepts crucial for this study. The fourth advantage is 
that such an approach allows us to understand operations of informal fish traders since we would 
have grasped the theoretical aspects of the informal economy.  
3.2. Governance and fisheries 
In its broadest sense, governance refers to how any organisation or country is run. Governance 
has undergone transformations since the public sector reforms (like the privitasation and 
commercialisation of state entities) in many developed countries. These reforms meant that some 
of the roles which were exclusively performed by the state had to be shifted to markets, quasi-
markets and networks (Bevir 2009). So for most of the cases in the world today, the state relies 
on other players to secure its intentions and deliver its policies (Bevir 2009). The IMF views 
governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority necessary to 
manage a nation’s affairs (IMF 2007). Governance has to do with how political actors affect 
formal and informal rules; how they live by and through rules but that such rules could be, but 
are not necessarily, of the network type (Kjær 2011). Governance can also be viewed as the 
power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action 
(Stoker 1998). The argument is that entities depend on other actors to achieve their goals and 
each entity needs the other even though one entity may dominate the process of exchange. In a 
value chain, governance refers to the structure of relationships and coordination mechanisms that 
exist between economic agents in that value chain (Kjær  2011). As a result, it is argued that the 
old and traditional understanding of governance as referring to the state as the sole governor is 
no longer accurate in today’s world. Governance is the whole spectrum of public as well as 
private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes 
the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions 
that enable them (Kooiman et al.  2008). Small-scale fisheries are an institution in that their 
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term’s usage has constituted a frame of reference for approaches to fisheries and fisheries 
governance. HLPE (2014: 73) argues that: 
Governance could, in a simplified way, be summarized as being composed of three 
elements: the rules themselves (including formal and informal ones); the way/process by 
which they are established and who contributes to it; the way they are implemented (and 
monitored etc.) and who is involved.  
Governance looks at issues on how people decide and which people decide on what needs to be 
done at different levels within given institutions. In fisheries this looks at the way the fishery 
resources are managed, organized and run. Within fisheries, governance seeks to identify 
governance challenges for fisheries and aquaculture to deliver on food security and nutritional 
goals (HLPE 2014, Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011).  
From a policy point of view, the scrutiny of governance in value chains is very important in the 
sense that it allows the identification of institutional arrangements that are required to improve 
the capabilities and efficiency in the value chain, remedy distributional distortions and increase 
value added within the sector (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). It was noted that the issue of 
governance is critical in terms of how fisherfolk interact and conduct their business activities 
within the informal setting. It is important to note that definitions of governance may vary given 
that its key concepts are derived from innumerable disciplines like public administration, 
political science, economics, business and sociology (Bevir 2009, Stoker 1998).  
3.2.1 Why do we need governance in fisheries?  
Studying governance aids us to “…explore abstract analyses of the construction of social orders, 
social coordination, or social practices irrespective of their specific content” (Bevir, 2009: 3). 
Governance is particularly important because it determines who has access to fisheries resources 
and has bearing on the integrity of fisheries resources and the distribution of fish benefits (HLPE 
2014). The HLPE (2014) argues that in most countries, little attention is given to the ways 
different individuals and groups (including poorer and marginalized people in the fisheries and 
aquaculture supply chains, but also poor consumers more generally) will gain, lose, or be 
excluded from access to fish resources and to fish as a food commodity.  
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3.2.2 Actors in governance  
The interactive perspective on governance argues that society is made up of a number of 
governing actors, who are constrained or enabled by their surroundings (Kooiman and Bavinck 
2013). Actors are any social unit possessing agency or power of action which includes 
individuals, associations, firms, governmental agencies and international bodies. Actors in 
governance depend on the type of government in place and on whether the place is within a rural 
or urban setting. Within governance spheres various groups of actors seek to have their voices 
heard. Within a rural setting, actors would typically include traditional and religious leaders, 
powerful business people, farmers, school governing boards, NGOs and councillors. In urban 
areas actors can take the form of political parties, media lobbyists, NGOs, workers’ organisations 
(for example the Confederation of South African Trade Unions and its affiliates), business 
organisations like the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  
Fig 5 identifies the main actors in an urban setting. All other actors apart from government are 
collectively known as “civil society.” In some parts of the world, criminal syndicates (like the 
mafia) have become powerful actors such that they are able to lobby and influence the 
governance process. In some political spheres, powerful politically connected families may also 
influence governance through corruption. Governance has been identified to be any pattern of 
rule that arises either when the state is dependent upon others or when it plays little or no role 
(Bevir 2009). As a result there are types of governance which include global governance and 
corporate governance. Governance expresses a growing awareness of the ways in which forms of 
power and authority can secure order even in the absence of state activity (Bevir 2009). Within 
that line of reasoning we arrive at what is known as the interactive fisheries governance 
framework.  
Kooiman and Bavinck (2013: 9) argue that, “Interactive governance is a theoretical perspective 
that emphasizes the governing roles of state, market and civil society.” The two authors point out 
that governance theory comes in different versions and schools, all of which share the view that 
governance is beyond government. This state of affairs is caused by societal realities of diversity, 
dynamics and complexity, which rule out the state from being the only governor (Kooiman and 
Bavinck 2013). In the view of the two authors, ‘interactive governance’, has to do with solving 
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societal problems and creating opportunities through interface between civil, public and private 
people and organizations (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). 
Repeated failure to acknowledge and examine the diversity, complexity, and dynamics of small-
scale fisheries can aggravate problems for fisheries governance as policies designed on 
assumptions of homogeneity or on outdated conditions dither on the reality of complex, 
globalised, and changing fisheries (Johnson 2006). The fisheries and marine ecosystems face 
many challenges but their diversity, complexity, and dynamics make it impossible to prescribe a 
fixed set of interventions that will hold for all cases (Bavinck et al. 2005). Such a flexible 
process orientation is necessary to match the diversity and complexity of actors and problems 
within and among fisheries, and to respond to the transformations in their relationships and the 
conditions within which they are embedded. Such an approach has been adopted by the 
FishGovNet and highlights the importance of the institutions through which actors negotiate 
rules, sanctions, and incentives (Bavinck et al. 2005). 
 
As has been mentioned above, traditional theories deal with governance issues related to actions 
by government. And yet it can be seen that these days governance is done in many organisations 
leading to corporate governance which essentially deals with the running of private companies 
and any such organisations. Private enterprises, civic organizations, communities, political 
parties, universities, the media, and the general public, among others, are all in one way or 
another involved in governance (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Kooiman and Bavinck (2005: 17) 
thus define interactive governance as: 
The whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and to create societal 
opportunities, including the formulation and application of principles guiding those 
interactions and care for institutions that enable them. 
 
According to the two authors, interactive governance seeks to tackle problems in society and 
identify opportunities within a given situation.  
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3.2.3 Governance within South African fisheries  
Governance in South African fisheries appears to adopt the top-down approach since the DAFF 
prescribes rules and regulations on fisheries management with little consultation with 
stakeholders. In this respect government plays its part by establishing rules within the fishing 
industries. These rules come in the form of regulations, by-laws and legislation. The South 
African government, through the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 
issues permits to different categories of fisheries according to the size and type of fish or 
Figure 5: Urban Actors 
Source: UNESCAP, 2009. 
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seafood. These permits are commonly referred to as permit conditions (DAFF 2010b). 
Governments use various policies and instruments to ensure that the levels of capture of fishery 
resources are adhered to (HLPE 2014). Some of the measures used have to do with the 
management of fishing capacities and fishing rights, including individually allocated annual 
quotas. An increasing number of countries use rules like annual catch quotas to manage marine 
and fresh water resources. Rules and regulations in fishing are made to achieve certain objectives 
like outlawing poaching (e.g. perlemoen poaching in Hangberg in Hout Bay), reducing 
overfishing or exploitation of fishery resources which are facing extinction.  
3.2.4 Governability 
Within the realms of interactive governance, governability is defined as “the overall capacity for 
governance of any societal entity or system” (Kooiman et al. 2008: 3), whereby a societal system 
is understood to consist of a combination of human and natural characteristics. The analysis of 
governance focuses on actors within the decision-making process. Players in the process are both 
formal and informal.  The principle of interactive fisheries governance identifies three players 
within its governance framework. These are the state, markets and civil society (Kooiman and 
Bavinck 2013). 
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Figure 6: Interactive governance perspective of a societal system 
Source:  Kooiman and Bavinck,  2013 
 
The definition of governability is built on the notion that societies, or parts thereof termed 
societal systems, are made up of three related components: a system-to-be governed, a governing 
system, and governing interactions (See Fig. 6). Such an approach proposes that governability 
depends on the merits of the object of governance (the system- to-be-governed), its subject (the 
governing system) and the connection (governing interactions) between the two (Kooiman et al. 
2008). Governors, the governed, and their relations all contribute to the available governability. 
Such a viewpoint has important consequences for an appraisal of governing capacities. Rather 
than attributing failure to a shortcoming of only the governing system, it urges for a holistic 
assessment of the situation at hand. Governability depends on the ability of a governing system 
to deliver on the challenges that the system-to-be-governed raises (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). 
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3.2.5 Governance in fish chains 
Fish chains move from the marine ecology, through harvesting, processing, marketing and 
distribution, to the end consumer and, in so doing, they seep into multiple scale levels. Kooiman 
and Bavinck (2013) argue that it follows that the shrimp extracted from a particular ecosystem 
in, for example, South India, proceeds, through transactions at local, national and international 
levels, to the consumers’ plates in Europe, North America, or East Asia. And yet another species 
of little international demand, is destined more for the local market, and follows a different chain 
route with its own configuration of actors (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). In the Western Cape, 
South Africa, hake (Merluccius capensis and Merluccius paradoxus) is an example of the former 
while snoek is an example of the latter. Most snoek is consumed fresh locally within the 
metropolitan area of Cape Town. In addition, the two authors argue that governing interactions 
are mutually influencing relations between two or more actors or entities in a governance setting. 
The minimal condition for governance interactions is the willingness or ability of actors to 
participate within a system (Gordon et al. 2011, Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). As a result, the 
interactive governance theory suggests that the central features of the system-to-be governed and 
the governing system are normally reflected in governing interactions (Kooiman and Bavinck  
2013, Stoker  1998). A well-organized and powerful societal sector will thus find these qualities 
represented in governing interactions (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013).  
 
As a result, less complex fisheries chains thus require significantly different governing 
arrangements than do more complex chains. For example, a large commercial fishery that uses a 
few large vessels to exploit a few relatively stable resources with outputs that are processed and 
sold in supermarkets may be inherently more governable than a widely dispersed, small-scale 
fishery from which products are distributed freshly by a large number of middlemen with little 
organization of either fishers or distributors (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). It would appear that 
snoek falls within this category since the langanas have little organisation amongst themselves 
and are scattered all over the south eastern townships as they conduct their business at their 
exclusive designated spots. 
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There are different stakeholders within fisheries and for that reason they have competing and, 
more often than not, conflicting interests, values and worldviews. Thus, in practice it is close to 
impossible to get consensus about what the problems are and how to go about solving them. 
Even when they share similar interests, different stakeholders tend to state the problem in their 
own way. Homogeneity is very difficult to find across the board. This is also reflected in the 
concerns that each group would consider most important, thus differentiating what they want the 
governing system to concentrate on (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). The way small fishers are 
organized and are interacting with traders plays a crucial role in determining income, both in 
level and stability, and to provide viable livelihood activities (HLPE 2014). Governing 
interactions are mutually influencing relations between two or more actors or entities in a 
governance setting (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Governance interactions require that there be a 
willingness and the ability of actors to participate. However it is difficult to ensure that all 
members of society take part in governance initiatives if one considers the levels of illiteracy and 
poverty which prevail in most fishing communities in developing countries. There is always a 
danger of elite seizure from the enlightened and powerful within such communities. In any case, 
the concept of democracy may be little understood in such societies. 
 
3.2.6 What happens when a governance system fails? 
Hauck (2008) argues that in South Africa the illegal harvesting of abalone and rock lobster 
continues because poachers see it as a way of getting justice. This is especially so as they feel 
that they were marginalised during apartheid and now they are being excluded from participating 
fully within the fisheries sector by the new policies being made by the democratic government. A 
more inclusive governance of voluntary sustainability standards would create partnerships and 
initiatives which work better for small fishers and operators, both by including food security and 
nutrition concerns in the standards and by devising procedures adapted to the needs and 
capacities of small actors (HLPE 2014). According to Hauck (2008), poachers view that 
implementation of top down policies worsens their plight since they prohibit them from 
accessing these valuable marine resources. If the law is seen by the poor to be consolidating 
some groups, compliance with the law is reduced. People then break rules since they feel that it 
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is their right and this is a form of social protest especially when fishers are unemployed and poor 
and they do not have any other sources of food or income from fishing (Hauck 2008). Johnson 
(2013) argues that a broader conception of fisheries governance may be in society’s best interest 
especially in the developing countries since there are so many people who are involved within 
these fisheries and secondly because of the need to create sustainable fisheries which contribute 
economically and socially. It appears that the application of the interactive fisheries governance 
framework as espoused by Kooiman and Bavinck (2013) could be the solution to make rules and 
regulations morally binding on the part of all stakeholders especially fishing communities. 
Jentoft (2013) argues that interactive governance allows for stakeholders to reach some 
agreement on which priorities to pursue and how evaluations should be done. Jentoft (2013: 63) 
concludes by saying: 
Regardless of power differentials, interactive governance theory advocates a participatory 
process characterized by transparency, accountability, cohesiveness and inclusiveness. 
These governance principles are also about social justice, i.e. the right to be recognized 
and to have a say in the decision-making on issues within which people have things at 
stake. Thus, for enhancing governability, procedural justice is as much about 
governability as it is about distributional justice, and procedural justice is as important as 
the institutional design of governance systems. 
 
The crux of the matter on what entails interactive governance is that fisheries as resources must 
be managed democratically with all stakeholders taking part in the making of the most important 
decisions which have far reaching consequences for everyone concerned as well as the 
sustainability and health of the resource being exploited.   
3.3 Power relations 
In his critique of Michel Foucault's philosophical work, Bălan (2010) gives us an insight into 
what power entails. Power is understood to be the capacity of an agent to impose his or her will 
over the will of the powerless, or the ability to force them to do things they do not wish to do. In 
this sense, power is understood as possession, as something owned by those in power. People get 
power over others for various reasons (Bălan 2010). Moncrieffe (2004) argues that the more 
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common perception of power is that it is essentially negative: power compels people to do what 
they would not choose to do. Power distorts knowledge and truth, and relies on repression and 
violence. Power may have autocratic tendencies. Power describes the ability of persons or groups 
to get things done effectively, particularly when their goals are obstructed by some kind of 
human and institutional resistance or opposition (Moncrieffe 2004). The main poverty 
dimensions, the lack of income and assets, the lack of voice and power as well as vulnerability 
have more impact on the lives of informal economy actors than on the formal economy (Becker 
2004).  The privileged and economically powerful persons have the ability to make other people 
work for them. Influential leaders become centrally positioned both in the knowledge and gear-
exchange networks, can play a particularly important role in community-level natural-resource 
governance in general, and in instigating communities to collectively transform the way they use 
their natural resources in particular (Crona and Bodin  2010). Power relationships occur where 
there is an unbalance of power between the people interacting within a system or an institution. 
Dumont (1996) argues that an individual, whether s/he wishes to or not, fits into some sort of a 
network of power relationships which is often very complex. This is true for everyone whether 
he or she holds a position of authority or is subjected to it, whether he has the means to impose 
his wish upon those who are dependent on him, or whether he is obliged to hedge between the 
different forces which try to impose themselves on him. Everyone is a victim of power relations 
networks Dumont (1996). If one is more powerful than the other, then such a person feels strong 
and in control of themselves and the situation. The lesser powered person possibly will feel 
abused and generally puts up with the controlling and manipulative ways of the person in higher 
power (Crona and Bodin 2010).  
Value chains experience repetitive interactions with a certain organisation linked to this amongst 
the various actors in the specific value chain. This, according to Gordon et al. (2011) reflects on 
power relations or governance of the chain. The power that any actors may have in a chain is 
reflected by the degree of their ability to make other parties take particular actions or their ability 
to be deaf to the demands of others. Power relations as used in the value chain analysis to 
describe actors who not only determine their own actions but may powerfully influence the 
ability of others to act, setting parameters for others to conform (Gordon et al. 2011, Kooiman 
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and Bavinck 2013, Stoker 1998). Moncrieffe (2004) asserts that sometimes people may become 
poor because of the deliberate actions and inactions of others. The dominant and the powerful 
groups are able to influence resource allocation and exploitation by preventing or helping the 
poor to improve their ‘capacity to make purposive choice’/exercise agency. As a result, poverty 
is likely to deepen when people are trapped in arrangements that limit their power, which the 
World Bank defines as their ‘capacity to make choice effective’ (Moncrieffe 2004). The 
dominant and powerful are always able to have their way in many instances.  
3.3.1 Examples of power relations at play  
Power relations have an effect on how natural resources are exploited and more so fisheries. In 
the cases of Ghana, Tarawa and Sao Tome and Principe, power is strongly concentrated in the 
hands of fish traders. Traders command more power as they would have pre-financed fishing 
trips. These traders have the exclusive rights to buy the fish from the same fishers whom they 
pre-financed at preferred prices (Tekanene 2004, IFAD 1999, Overa 1993, Walker 2002). 
However, power shifts because of some reasons. In studies conducted in Ghana’s Western 
region, Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi and Bangladesh it was shown that power relations may 
shift depending on the season and the extent of fishing success (Chiwaula et al, 2012, IFAD 
1999, Gordon et al. 2011:28, NORAD FAO Project 2012). Seasonality shifts the balance of 
power between fishers and traders. In the high season when fish catches are many, fish traders 
command more power in determining fish prices. Since fish is a perishable commodity, fishers 
have little choice but to sell them to the traders before they turn bad.  
Another interesting case study is that of Sarawak which showed that during the high season, 
middlemen would ask for credit form fishers. Under the circumstances, the middlemen would 
not have enough cash to pay the fishermen right at the time of sale (Merlijn 1989: 692). Fishers 
give fish to middlemen on credit who will pay later after selling fish. During the low season 
fishers have more bargaining power because of fish scarcity. However, it will be noted that, there 
is a symbiotic relationship between the women and the fishers in the fishing industry. As 
Chiwaula et al (2012 12) remarked, “Neither could survive without the other” and that the 
relationship between fishers and middlemen is not one of exploitation but one of social 
agreement with mutual benefit. Fishers need an efficient marketing system for their fish since 
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fish is perishable. They also require loans and inputs without having to go through cumbersome 
procedures. Middlemen on the other hand require an uninterrupted supply of substantial fish. As 
a result middlemen are always prepared to address the needs of fishers to the best of their ability. 
And for this reason, many fishers have long-lasting relationships with specific middlemen 
(Merlijn 1989). 
  
3.4 The informal economy  
Snoek traders are part of the blossoming informal economy in South Africa. The term “informal 
economy” is more appropriate to use instead of “informal sector” because the former indicates 
that there is a continuum from the informal to the formal ends of the economy. Informal 
economy also includes enterprises as well as employment in developing, transition, and 
advanced industrialized economies. However, the two terms will be used interchangeably in this 
article. Informal and formal institutions coexist and they shape important development outcomes 
(de Soysa and Jütting 2006). The term “informal sector or economy” has assumed other names 
like the second economy, the black market, the unofficial economy, the parallel economy or the 
shadow economy (Davids  2011, Dijkstra  2006). 
3.4.1 The informal economy: A historical perspective 
As is widely known, the term “informal sector” has its roots in the work of Keith Hart, a British 
anthropologist who “discovered” the informal sector while working amongst low-income 
activities in Accra of unskilled migrants from Northern Ghana who could not find wage 
employment, in 1971 (Bangasser  2000, Gërxhani  2003, Losby et al. 2002).  Davids (2011) 
argues that Hart thought that the informal sector in Ghana would disappear once Ghana 
developed towards industrialisation (Davids 2011). Hart’s argument was that as the economy 
developed through capitalism, it would have the ability to absorb the labour that was excess at 
the time. Decent jobs would be created as the industry developed. Labour within the informal 
economy would abandon its activities in pursuit for better paying activities within the formal 
industries. However more than 40 years later the informal economy still exists in Ghana and 
other developing countries and indications are that it continues to grow.  
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The term “informal sector” was then adopted and popularised by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in 1972 on its mission to Kenya (Arellano 1994). In its seminal article 
“Report on income and employment in Kenya” (1972) the ILO mission argued that the informal 
economy was mostly small-scale in nature and could not compare with large-scale and capital 
intensive production conducted by the corporate establishments. The assumption at the time was 
that the informal and formal economies had no links between each other. The dualists were in 
agreement with Hart that the informal economy was a temporary phenomenon and was going to 
disappear (Davids 2011, Wiego 2011).   
 
3.4.2 The dualist model  
The proponents of the dualist model argue that the informal and formal economies do not have 
links between them and are intrinsically different (Davids 2011). The model propounds that the 
two sectors operate autonomously from each other. The arguments are that the formal economy 
is difficult to establish especially in developing countries (as it requires huge capital outlay and 
depends on advanced technology), depends on external inputs and experiences economies of 
scale to survive. The formal economy is distinct from the informal economy in the sense that 
entry to engage in its activities is easy, and utilizes local indigenous resources and the businesses 
are characteristically small and run along family lines exploiting low levels of technology. Fig 7 
is a diagrammatic depiction of the dualist economy.  
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Figure 7: The Dualist Model of economic activity 
Source: Davids (2011: 9). 
 
3.4.3 The underground model 
Dualists categorised formal and informal economies and failed to account for legal products 
which are produced in criminal ways. The dualists’ perspective has been criticised on the basis 
that this approach acknowledged the existence of the informal and formal economies and yet it 
ignored illegal activities (Davids 2011). Against the criticism of the dual economy model, it is 
therefore acknowledged that there are linkages between the formal and the informal economies 
(Du Toit and Neves 2007, Petersen 2011, Neves and du Toit 2012, Davids  2011). This is partly 
because some products are manufactured illegally and yet end up being sold to formal players 
who use them legally (Petersen 2011). Added to that, some people perform activities in self-
employment initiatives and yet at the same time they combine them with regular wage or salary 
income (Losby et al. 2002). There are enterprising individuals who work and earn regular 
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salaries and yet they switch activities. They earn wages from the normal working hours and then 
engage in informal activities afterwards. The weaknesses of the dualist mode led Rakowski to 
develop the “underground model” (Davids 2011). As Davids (2011) argues, Rakowski’s model 
identifies products which are produced using illegal production processes and yet at the end the 
final product becomes a legal output sold in licenced outlets. The underground model argues that 
the informal economy occurred due to economic crises, restrictive labour laws and globalisation. 
Innovative business people sought ways of avoiding bureaucracy and taxation and started to 
manufacture products without the knowledge of the authorities. Once manufactured the products 
would be sold as legal goods. Petersen (2011) acknowledges this position by arguing that link 
between the formal and informal economy can be seen in this regard as individuals enter and exit 
the two economies. Sub-contracting between the two economies occurs. Another linkage 
between the two sectors is that people who are working within the informal sector earn income 
which they use to acquire goods and services which are supplied by the formal sector (Davids 
2011). Income flows either way between the two economies. Informal enterprises are intertwined 
with formal sector cash inputs. (Davids 2011) goes on to argue that the linkages between the 
formal and informal sectors include not only the leveraging of resources derived from the formal 
sector into informal enterprises, but also an extensive interaction between formal and informal 
sector employment. The informal economy actors supply formal businesses with inputs, finished 
goods and services and vice versa (see Fig 8). 
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Figure 8: The Underground Model showing linkages between the formal and the informal sectors. 
Source: Davids  (2011: 9) 
 
3.4.4 The informal sector defined: Reviewing existing literature  
The informal economy is so diverse, that it is defined in many ways depending on the context, 
discipline and country concerned. The many definitions of the informal economy should not be 
an obstacle but a possibility to identify relevant entry points and to select target groups for 
various interventions (Becker 2004). As such there is no universally accepted definition of the 
informal economy because of its heterogeneity and diverse activities (Becker 2004, Losby et al. 
2002, Yu 2010, Yu 2012). In developing countries the term informal economy is associated with 
unregistered and unregulated small-scale (and dirty) activities which generate employment and 
income for the urban (and even rural) poor. Referring to the1972 ILO mission to Kenya, Becker 
(2004 8) informs us that:  
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The mission observed that the informal sector described activities that are unrecognised, 
unrecorded, unprotected or unregulated by public authorities was not confined to 
marginal activities but also included profitable enterprises. Furthermore, the activities of 
the informal sector were mostly ignored, rarely supported and sometimes actively 
discouraged by policy makers and governments. 
An accurate definition is difficult to get because the term has been used to describe such sundry 
activities as street vending, hawking, undeclared domestic work, barter, corruption, tax evasion, 
driving taxis, collecting recyclables, rickshaw pullers, barbers, bookkeeping, arts and crafts, 
pottery, bricklaying, beadwork, the Mafia, selling umqomboti (traditional African beer in 
shebeens – South African context), cool drinks and different types of meat on the streets 
(Bernabe  2002, Becker  2004, Blaauw  2005, du Toit and Neves  2007, Siqwana-Ndulo  2013).  
 
Getting a universally accepted definition is further compounded as some countries include the 
agricultural sector when defining the informal economy while others do not. This complicates 
the task since it becomes difficult to make cross-country comparisons in terms of how much the 
informal economy contributes to each country’s GDP. Failure to define and measure the informal 
sector in an appropriate manner, hampers the ability of policy makers to identify all the range of 
activities and address the concerns of the informal economy (Essop and Yu 2008a, Essop and Yu 
2008b, Willemse 2011). In Africa, informal activities are undervalued in terms of the roles they 
play when we try to factor in their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) because 
there are no statistics on them (Ubale  2013). Informal activities in many countries show that 
their operations are characterised by minimal adherence to safety, hygiene standards and the law. 
As a consequence of the failure to get a common definition of the informal economy, it was 
considered prudent to have a glance at what other authors have to say on this litigious 
expression. 
3.4.5 Other definitions of the informal economy 
This section looks at some of the definitions of the informal sector. Table 2 below summarises 
these findings.  
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Table 2: Some of the definitions of the informal economy from selected authors 
Author Definition 
Statistics South 
Africa (SESE-
SSA) 2014: 3 
 
The informal sector is defined in terms of registration and the size of the 
business in terms of the number of employees. In line with the international 
guidelines, agriculture and private households are identified separately and 
not included in either the formal or informal sectors. 
Becker (2004: 12) The unregulated non-formal portion of the market economy that produces 
goods and services for sale or for other forms of remuneration and  
encompasses all activities by workers and economic units that are 
practically not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements. 
Schneider (2006: 
4) 
All currently unregistered economic activities that contribute to the 
officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product (GNP). 
Hart (1973: 68) The informal economy is generally a part of the overall economy that has 
low income opportunities, temporary employment, low productivity, 
constitutes mainly self-employed persons, small-scale enterprises using 
labour intensive activities in the primary, secondary, tertiary and service 
industry, whether legitimate or not.  
Willemse (2011: 7) Informal sector, informal economy, informal business and informal trader 
refer to people who conduct informal street trading on a small scale, mostly 
from street pavements, and who, as a group offer a large variety of 
products and basic services to prospective clients. 
de Soysa and 
Jütting (2006: 3) 
 
Informal institutions are: a behavioural regularity based on socially-shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced 
outside of officially-sanctioned channels. 
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3.4.6 Why does the informal economy exist?  
It is recognised in some sectors that formal institutions alone do not shape human behaviour, but 
that much of what goes on can be explained also by informal institutions that are grounded in 
and emanate from a society’s culture (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). Informal structures and 
economies are therefore necessary in our lives. Bernabè (2002) argues that the informal economy 
is generated from bureaucracy and corruption. Illegal and criminal activities undermine the legal 
system and remove production from the official GDP statistics. This distorts cross-country 
comparisons of national income and GDP per capita Bernabè (2002). The informal economy 
appears to be growing and contributing significantly to the national incomes in both the 
developed and the developing world (Davids 2011). This is also the case in South Africa (SESE, 
Stats SA 2014). Studies done in Latin America showed that informal employment tended to rise 
during periods of instability and economic crisis (ILO  2002), Tokman  2007, Wiego  2011) and 
is a coping behaviour (Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay  2010). Research conducted on informal 
traders in Pretoria found that the majority of them had had formal jobs at one time in their lives. 
Retrenchments and scaling down of operations saw them unemployed (Blaauw 2005). This 
seems to support the argument that the informal economy tends to absorb people when formal 
employment opportunities are scarce (Davids 2011). It appears that as long as there are high rates 
of unemployment the informal economy is likely to continue to flourish. 
Far from being a phenomenon endemic in the developing world, informality can be found in 
developed nations. Examples given are within the regions of Sicily in Italy and in some streets of 
New York (Arellano 1994). Sicily is well known as a launch pad for Mafia-related activities 
whose influences have been felt even beyond the borders of Italy since the 1800s. Informal 
garment workers thrive in Toronto, as do shoemakers in Madrid, and electronic parts assemblers 
in Leeds (ILO 2002). Within the European Union it is estimated that the informal sector jobs 
account for 30% of total employment (ILO 2002). The United States is estimated to have 25% of 
its workforce within the informal economy (ILO 2002). However, compared to developed 
countries the informal economy in developing countries exists for different reasons (Davids 
2011). Davids argues that in developed countries the informal economy exists because of a 
“…negative perception of government and because of the burden various taxes imposed” 
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(Davids 2011: 1). In such a set-up it would pay more to work within the informal sector as such 
activities are not subject to taxation and stringent government regulations. 
In the developing world employment in the informal economy is survivalist in nature since 
engaging in informal activities enables participants to earn income for that fraction of the 
populace without jobs. For most part the unemployed have low levels of skills and fail to find 
other jobs (Davids 2011). This is why they end up turning to the informal economy for 
sanctuary. Studies conducted by the ILO on India, Mexico and South Africa show that the 
informal economy was a major component of total employment ranging from about 35% of total 
employment in South Africa to more than 60% in Mexico and more than 90% in India (ILO 
2002). In all three countries women were dominant players representing 30 to 90% of street 
vendors. The Survey of Employers and the Self-employed (SESE) conducted by Statistics SA 
established that informal businesses are predominantly run by black Africans, persons aged 35–
44 years, and those with the lowest levels of education (SESE, Stats SA  2014). An important 
role of informal trading is its ability to absorb unemployed people, young and old (SESE, Stats 
SA 2014, Siqwana-Ndulo 2013). In all developing countries self-employment comprises a 
greater share of employment representing 70% of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(81% if South Africa is excluded), 62 % in North Africa, 60% in Latin America and 59% in Asia 
(Becker 2004).        
3.4.7 The case for immigrants  
Sometimes the status of immigrants getting into a country just forces them to go into informal 
trading (Losby et al 2002). Immigrants reproduce the informal activities they have been doing in 
their countries of origin especially if they are moving from less developed countries to more 
developed countries. Immigrants usually get inferior work and command a heavy presence in 
sectors like restaurants, barber shops and they also guard cars. They are subject to exploitation 
and are often threatened by being reported to authorities if they do not comply (Losby et al 
2002).  
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3.4.8 South Africa and the informal economy 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) indicates that the informal sector in South Africa contributed 
5% to GDP (SESE, Stats SA 2014) and the sector continues to grow. In 2014, 15 million people 
are employed with 1, 5 million people working in the informal sector making 10% of the total 
employment (SESE, Stats SA 2014). There has been debate on which sex dominates within the 
informal sector. The latest statistics show that whereas the sector had previously been dominated 
by women, the tables have turned with more men than women in this sector at 55%. Siqwana-
Ndulo (2013) argues that in the past, more women were employed in the informal economy than 
men estimating that there are 2.4 million women in comparison to 1.6 million men and the 
majority of the traders are black women. A reconsideration of this claim clarifies that less than 
40% of the total increase in employment of 2.2 million was in wage employment in the formal 
sector (Casale et al. 2004, 10). Be that as it may, Petersen (2011) quotes Saunders (2005:130) as 
showing that there is a slightly larger share of male workers (averaging more than 55%) in the 
informal economy compared to their female counterparts. Male informal workers also 
constituted a slightly higher proportion than female workers in 2011 (Petersen 2011: 7). In the 
period under review the main activity within the informal sector activity had been trading, but 
now it has diversified into construction, manufacturing and to some extent finance.   
Informal employment is also important in non-urban areas (ILO 2002). There are significant 
differences in employment across provinces reflecting inter alia, the legacy of apartheid. In 
Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, formal employment is less than half of total employment. 
However, in the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces more than three quarters of people are 
employed in the formal economy (QLFS 2012). Limpopo has the highest informal businesses at 
6.3%, Mpumalanga at 6.1%, Gauteng at 5% and KwaZulu-Natal at 4.7%.  
By its very nature, informal economic activity goes unrecorded and is therefore difficult to 
measure, but some estimates value the informal economy at around 28% of South Africa’s GDP 
(QLFS 2012). South Africa’s GDP is estimated to be R2, 4 trillion. Hence the value of the 
informal sector becomes R120 billion. Most small informal businesses are run by black African 
men and those who have little education. 
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3.4.9 What is the significance of the informal sector? 
Most authors regard the sector in a positive way arguing that it is a source of livelihood for the 
poor (Becker  2004, Blaauw  2005, du Toit and Neves  2007, Nieland  2006, Willemse  2011). 
Becker (2004) contends that the informal economy may include restricted illegal and restricted 
legal operations but not criminal operators and that the informal economy is distinct from the 
criminal economy. The criminal economy deals with crime, illegal goods and services while the 
informal economy produces and distributes legal goods and services. Tokman (2007 4) estimates 
that, “out of every 100 new jobs created since 1980, around 60 have been informal”. This sector 
provides about half of total urban employment (Tokman 2007). The informal economy is large 
and its share in the labour market continues to grow steadily (Dijkstra 2006). The informal 
economy promotes survivalist strategies and reduces poverty among impoverished rural and 
urban communities by creating employment and savings opportunities and enhancing community 
development through improved entrepreneurial skills (Willemse 2011). The informal economy 
generates jobs and income and contributes to food supply. Informal players earn income and 
provide goods and services to their customers. It is argued that without the informal economy, 
the unemployment rate in South Africa would rise from 25% then to around 47.5% (QLFS 
2012). The informal sector contributes significantly to the South African economy since it is 
estimated that approximately 2.2 million people were employed in the informal sector in 2010 
(Casale et al. 2004, Quantec Research  2011). The latest figures from Statistics SA indicate that 
in the second quarter of 2014, estimates put the figure of those employed within the informal 
sector at 1, 5 million people (QLFS 2014, Quarter 2). The fact that the informal sector creates 
jobs is true in many cases. For example, studies which were done on informal fish traders within 
the Lake Chad Basin, i.e. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger and Nigeria found 
that the informal sector created jobs and income (Nieland 2006). The sector also helps in small-
scale distribution in both rural and urban economies. Becker (2004) argues that in all developing 
countries, self-employment comprises a greater share of informal employment than wage 
employment and represents 70% of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The informal economy caters for the needs of poor consumers by providing accessible and low-
priced goods and services (Becker 2004). Even some well to do members of society occasionally 
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acquire goods and services from informal traders at flea markets and road traffic intersections. 
Informal traders conduct their business within the cities and they serve a niche market and offer 
competitive prices.  
Informal traders seem to have a unique edge over formal establishments. Some of them do not 
pay rent for the places where they conduct their business from. From a marketing point of view, 
the most fundamental aspect of informality is to know the wishes and the needs of their 
customers. This allows the informal players to choose the most appropriate techniques for 
choosing their products and attracting the interest of customers and negotiating with them before 
clinching a deal (Arellano 1994). Some informal sector operations like shebeens, barber shops, 
and spaza shops open late at night and public holidays when the formal sector activity has since 
closed its doors. This is particularly a case in point on many shebeens in South African 
townships which open late during the week and even on Sundays when licenced dealers may be 
required to close shop by law. Informal snoek traders operate within the residential areas where 
their customers live and so create a convenience for them. 
In South Africa, prior to 1994, most informal economic activities were classified as illegal. With 
the dawn of democracy in South Africa and realizing the positive contribution of the sector, the 
major metropolitan areas of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Tshwane have made 
tremendous strides to incorporate informal traders in their strategic planning. They have drafted 
by-laws which seek to regulate and accommodate informal economic activities within their 
municipal areas. The failure by governments in developing countries in regard to supporting the 
informal sector is unfortunate given that the majority of populations, particularly the poorest, are 
supporting themselves from these activities (Becker 2004). Some organisations sympathise with 
informal traders. With the help of sympathetic NGOs, informal traders within the Johannesburg 
CBD were able to successfully challenge the local authority in courts in 2013 to allow informal 
traders to conduct their work when the city was banning them. Informal traders have been given 
a respite by the courts and continue to flourish in Johannesburg’s areas within the precinct of 
Park Station, Hillbrow and the central business district. 
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3.4.10 The bad side of informal economic activities 
Some authors, while acknowledging the positive contributions from the informal economic 
activities, are of the view that the informal economy provides a fertile podium for underground 
illegal activities because people use it to dodge paying taxes, steal state property, bribe and 
engage in decadent and illicit activities like drug trafficking (Bernabè 2002, Dijkstra 2006). 
Some view the informal sector as a symptom of developmental backwardness. It is a problem 
that needs to be resolved, while others regard it as a positive dynamic which enables large 
numbers of people to gain a foothold in the urban economy (Willemse 2011). A big informal 
sector is likely to lead to reduced tax collections and funding of public goods (Frey and 
Schneider 2000). Despite the advantages, the “inability of the informal sector to comply with 
certain aspects of labour legislation is a reflection of the unsatisfactory conditions in which the 
informal sector operates” (Hansenne, 1991: 38-39). The street traders are generally poor, 
unskilled people at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder. Sometimes the traders selling 
wares in the streets are sub-contracted by some powerful individuals. They are agents who have 
been sub-contracted to sell and are paid commission by the owners. Most workers within the 
informal economy share one thing in common: the lack of formal labour and social protection 
(ILO 2002). A number of workers in South Africa working for formal economy enterprises face 
informal working conditions which include the lack of written contracts, labour brokerage, 
temporary or casual terms of employment and are not entitled to paid leave (Western Cape 
Government 2007). The main poverty dimensions, lack of income and assets, lack of voice and 
power as well as vulnerability have more impact on the lives of informal economy actors than on 
the formal economy entrepreneurs and workers (Becker 2004). In addition to that, informal 
actors have strained relationships amongst themselves. Associations which purport to represent 
informal actors are occasionally involved in conflicts. For example, in some cases intense 
violence arises within the taxi industry as rival taxi associations brawl for routes for their 
members (du Toit and Neves 2012). Du Toit and Neves quote a report on an official government 
inquiry into the taxi industry in the Western Cape which found that the taxi associations operate 
“…like a modern day mafia with the power to extort monies from operators, the ability to kill 
people who disagree with them and threaten their interests” (du Toit and Neves 2012: 13). The 
taxi associations use hired hit men to kill since they command the resources to do so.  
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According to Hansenne (1991: 6), informal traders operate on the fringes of the law. They are 
often associated with criminal activities and are consequently subjected to harassment. Informal 
traders face major difficulties such as fear of violence, crime, stock theft and foreign informal 
actors have the added fear of xenophobic attacks (Willemse 2011). In most municipalities in 
South Africa, relationships with police are always strained, especially when law enforcement 
agents are viewed as antagonistic to informal traders’ activities. Sometimes the police are 
accused of confiscating goods belonging to informal traders that they will be selling. It is against 
such a background that informal sector players need to be organised amongst themselves so that 
they have a voice and be heard (Becker 2004, Subasinghe et al. 2012; Chiwaula et al. 2012, 
Willemse 2011). 
3.5 Gender dimensions in selling fish  
Gender is an integral and inseparable part of livelihoods in fisheries. The purpose of putting a 
gender lens on value chain analysis is to understand why men and women fulfil certain roles at 
every level in the chain, which roles provide the most benefits, and who has the access to and 
control over resources to participate fully in the chain, and thereby to find entry points for 
improvement (Kruijssen et al 2013. Gender is viewed as the psychological, social and cultural 
differences between males and females which is socially constructed and dynamic (Ellis 2000, 
Giddens 1993, Kantor 2013, Udong 2011). Kantor (2013: 4) argues that: 
This means gender (and other intersecting forms of social difference such as ethnicity and 
class) affects: how women and men conceive of themselves and their capabilities; how 
women and men interact within the framework of social expectations; and how 
opportunities are structured and resources distributed within institutions like the market 
and the state.  
Gender is fundamentally about power, subordination and inequality and it is also about changing 
these to secure greater equality in all its manifestations for women (Ellis 2000). There is 
widespread recognition of the importance of gender in development (Weeratunge et al. 2012). 
Within the fisheries sector, both women and men are involved in the trade of fish across the 
world. It is important to recognise that women’s activities in the management of natural 
resources as well as the economic opportunities open to them are in most cases constrained. 
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Women make up half the workforce in capture fisheries value chains and a large share in 
aquaculture chains but their contributions are under recognized, under enumerated and more 
often informal (HLPE  2014, Yahaya  1998). Their lack of control over decisions concerning the 
use of key resources, and their insecure rights over land, trees, and products can limit women’s 
incentives to invest in “sound” environmental management (Yahaya 1998, Leach  1992). Men 
and women should be given equal opportunities so that they can realise their fullest potential. 
This will open up new avenues and boost agricultural and fisheries productivity within the small 
scale sector. However, there is a major knowledge gap in fisheries in terms of gender and 
therefore cannot progress on gender-equitable and well-targeted approaches to sector 
development, particularly with regard to food security and nutrition (Chiwaula et al. 2012, HLPE  
2014, Timmers  2012). The work of participants in fish value chains is highly gendered and 
fraught with inequalities, creating food security and nutrition challenges (HLPE 2014). For most 
of the time gender roles in fisheries portray men as fishers who go on boats to fish and women as 
fish sellers who conduct their operations on land (BNP 2008, HLPE 2014). Johnson (2013) 
argues that the “onshore-at sea division” shows the gendered character of employment within 
fisheries. Men and women’s employment is of a different nature and is remunerated differently. 
However, such a gendered character of employment shows us that employment activity within 
the fisheries sector is linked since women and men need each other within their activities. 
However, while such an overview on the professional roles of men and women is largely correct, 
a closer look at gender in fisheries reveals a more complex situation according to countries and 
cultural contexts.  
 
Information on data on fisheries employment in Europe shows that, also as in developed 
countries, very few women work on board vessels. And yet, they represent a third of the total 
sector workforce of some 400 000 people and they are mostly employed in the fish processing 
industry (BNP 2008). Women work in fish production and value chains but they are hardly 
visible and yet they perform activities like gleaning, diving, post-harvest processing and vending, 
which are underestimated (HLPE  2014).  
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There are few exceptions to the rule nevertheless. For example, in some countries, like Benin, 
Cambodia, Congo, Mali, and Thailand, women fish or collect fish on the lake in their own boats 
(BNP 2008). In some developing countries, men traders are actively involved in value chains for 
fish of high commercial value (Chiwaula et al. 2012). In Kenya men dominate the trading and 
processing of the Nile perch which is export oriented and of high value (Abila 2003). Under such 
circumstances men occupy all activities along the entire value chain from fishing right to trading 
and processing of fish. Abila (2003) corroborates this version by arguing that male actors in 
Kenya, Lake Victoria dominate the scene as they play roles that women used to play in the past. 
Another strand of the argument is that in Southern Africa specifically Botswana, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, certain parts of Malawi and Mozambique for example small scale fish trade is 
predominantly done by men (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Mmopelwa and Ngwenya 2008, Sverdrup-
Jensen and Nielsen 1998). And yet for most of West Africa – most parts of Central Ghana and 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad – (Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998, Nieland; 2006, Udong et al. 
2010, Udong 2011) trading is a woman’s job. As such field work results on the snoek value 
chain prove that South Africa, being part of Southern Africa fits into the scenario that men 
instead of women dominate in selling snoek. The scenario where traders are men who sell fish, 
the traders rarely form part of the fishing communities. They travel from afar to buy fish from 
the fishers.  
3.5.1 Selected case studies of women pre-eminence within fisheries 
It is estimated that 82 million people are employed in postharvest activities in fisheries 
(processing, distribution and marketing) and that almost half (47%) of them are women (Jacinto 
and Pomeroy 2011, Mills et al. 2011). Writing about fisheries in Ghana, Overa argues that in 
addition to employment for a large number of men and women, the expansion in fisheries has led 
to wealth accumulation in the hands of canoe owners and wholesalers (Overa 1993). The 
resulting social stratification took place along gender lines within the dual-sex hierarchies. 
Through their intermediary roles in the market system, combined with their roles as wives, 
mothers and daughters, entrepreneurial women in the fisheries in many cases outclassed men, as 
when they were able to combine the positions of standing women and canoe owners (Overa 
1993). 
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Even though traditionally women are viewed as being the weaker of the two genders, there are 
some regions where the reverse may be true. In the fishing community of the Fanti people in 
Ghana, women have become powerful to the extent that they command vast amounts of 
resources in such a way that they are able to manoeuvre fishers who are predominantly men 
(Walker 2002). Instead of serving primarily as labourers and reproducers, women in both the 
colonial Gold Coast and independent Ghana have served as capitalists, entrepreneurs, and 
innovators throughout the establishment and development of the marine fishing sector (Overa 
1993, Walker 2002). Walker argues that 25% of canoe owners within the Fanti are women. Even 
if women were culturally prohibited from performing fishing duties there is nothing stopping 
them from owning and inheriting canoes. Owning canoes is seen as logically related to the fish 
trade business and it ensures a reliable supply of fish for the owner7. In yet another example of 
women’s power, Weeratunge and Snyder (2009) argue that there appears to be changing roles of 
women fish traders in Kerala in India where women were divesting from craft technology and 
investing into modern boats and moving from income earning activities to playing supportive 
roles in financial management and processing of fish. Despite such changing roles however, 
women in poor rural areas are still below their male counterparts in terms of social standing 
(Yahaya 1998). In a study of 15 selected Asian countries, it was found that women participate in 
almost all activities in the fisheries sector including the construction of fishing gears, fish sorting, 
fish handling, and fish processing with some women participating directly in fishing activities 
with their family members in lakes, rivers and streams (Siason et al. 2002).  
As within most fishing communities, women are dominant in fish trading and processing in 
Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and Uganda (Antunes 1998, Gordon et al. 2011, IFAD 
1999, Timmers 2012, Udong  2011). Women fish traders in Ghana have formed associations 
which allow them to speak with one voice. At landing sites in Ghana for example the 
“konkohene” or the Queen Mother sets or influences prices at which all fish is sold from the 
boats on a given day. The “konkohene” is the leader of the women who are in the fish selling 
business. There could not have been a more apt description of the powers of the fish mothers in 
the Western Region of Ghana as done by Gordon et al, (2011: 22) thus: 
                                                  
7 This is known as backward integration in business economics.  
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The fish mothers essentially act as a monopsonistic (one buyer) cartel: they control 
access to supply through pre-financing and (since relatively few people have the 
resources to offer such credit) they limit membership of the group by the same 
mechanism. 
Closing the input gap between women and men would lead to an increase in agricultural output 
in certain developing countries (FAO 2010, Yahaya 1998, Weeratunge et al. 2012). And even if 
from the face of it women bear the brunt of gender inequities, these costs of lost agricultural 
production are distributed widely and are a cause of persistent poverty for all members of the 
society (Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). Therefore it is in the interest of all parties to promote 
greater equality in the fish sector, improve knowledge and to better inform policy and action to 
achieve food security and nutrition and gender equity (HLPE 2014). 
3.5.2 Women’s power as facilitators within small scale fisheries 
Women’s contribution and potential are underestimated. Fisheries in some developing countries 
may be dominated by women as opposed to the general view that it is a male domain 
(Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). Such women may come from the same household – they could 
be fishers’ wives or daughters (Udong et al. 2009).   
 
Studies conducted in several developing countries point to the fact that fish traders support 
fishing activities by lending money to fishers. Women traders pre-finance fishing trips and the 
more prosperous ones in Ghana and Nigeria own boats and canoes (Udong 2011, Tetteh  2007, 
Cheke  2012, Gordon et al. 2011, Walker  2002). They also tend to exploit the system to their 
maximum benefit within the social structures in the community. Some fish traders were married 
to fishers and command positions within their informal associations or even getting influential 
positions within households so that they would be able to manipulate the fish trade (Overa 1993, 
Walker  2002). In Burkina Faso women within fishing communities take risks by investing 
money in alternative income generation activities in post-harvest activities. This also increases 
the bargaining power that women wield over fishers. In that respect, women can influence the 
management of the fishery (Brugère et al. 2008). Udong et al.(2009) argue that the division of 
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labour between men and women has ensured guaranteed incomes which have given women 
traders a source of livelihood, autonomy, agency and a measure of independence.  
3.5.3 Customary prejudice against women in fish chains 
It is rare for women to go out to sea fishing with men. This sea-land dichotomy can be related to 
the fact that going to sea is risky because of fatigue at night and the occasional bad weather 
(HLPE 2014). In such cases men go fishing while the buying and selling of fish is exclusively 
done by women. And yet women’s work in handling and distribution of fish and fish products is 
critical to the food security in their communities (Loc et al. 2012, Gordon 2011, Antunes; 1998, 
Tekanene; 2004).  Nevertheless, customary beliefs, norms and laws also discriminate against the 
full participation of women within the fisheries sector (FAO 2006, HLPE  2014, Siason et al. 
2002). Women end up being confined to the lower ends of supply chains which are so-called 
‘informal’ sector in many developing countries. There are institutional and cultural constraints 
faced by the women traders in the various spheres of life they work in. In Egyptian aquaculture a 
study showed that the fish farming of tilapia and catfish was entirely male. The traders and 
wholesalers were also almost exclusively male (Macfadyen et al. 2011). Women were only 
located on the lower echelons of the fish value chains and this can be linked to the conservative 
nature of the Egyptian society. It is also difficult for women to access credit and the subsequent 
capital (Chiwaula et al. 2012). Anthropological studies of fishing communities along the 
Kanyakumari coast of Southern India relate to how fishing communities have evolved systems of 
keeping women away from the primary occupation of fishing by various social conditioning 
systems (Siason et al. 2002). Admittedly, one is tempted to argue that studies on gender relations 
in the fisheries/aquaculture sector remain at a pioneering stage and would be open for further 
research in that regard (Weeratunge and Snyder  2009).  
3.6 Multiple livelihood strategies  
In its simplest form, a livelihood is seen as a way to earn living. However, livelihoods within 
rural populations are varied and go beyond just earning an income to make a living. Probably the 
most often quoted definition of livelihood comes from Chambers and Conway (1992) who define 
a livelihood as encompassing capabilities, assets (stores and claims and access) and activities 
required for a means of living.  A livelihood can also be seen as “comprising assets, the activities 
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and the access to these that together determine the living gained by the individual or household,” 
(Ellis, 2000 10). It is also possible for us to accept that access to material resources, labour and 
capital, in the pursuit of a livelihood is shaped by normative and cultural factors such as lifestyle 
and identities (Long 2000, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). Livelihood approaches may be applied 
at multiple levels (Scoones 1999 as quoted by Johnson) although they are mostly applied at the 
household level (White and Ellison 2007, Johnson 2013). It may be argued that such an approach 
is plausible given that most people organise production, distribution and reproduction at the 
household level (Johnson 2006). In many fishing communities, people have established a social 
capital of kinship networks which allow them to access fishing knowledge, capital and resources 
which they personally may not possess, like boats or fishing gear. The livelihood approach has 
been a very valuable tool of understanding the way fish trading is gendered in many fishing 
communities and to various degrees, where for instance in some communities men act as fish 
traders whereas in other communities trading in fish is dominated by women. This approach is 
also useful in the sense that it facilitates our understanding of the various ways in which the 
people and households construct their livelihoods. 
3.6.1 Livelihood diversity 
Within fisheries, diversification is encouraged as a means for reducing dependence on fishing 
resource, making restrictive management easier and less controversial for those affected by such 
measures (Brugère et al. 2008, Carney 2002). Brugère et al. (2008) further assert that with the 
risks of overfishing, it is very important to examine diversification and its links to both poverty 
reduction and responsible fisheries. Fisherfolk8, just like their small-scale farmer counterparts, 
have been known the world over to adopt a wide range of livelihood strategies to buffer 
themselves against shocks and stresses. Even if there are few choices the fisherfolk try to engage 
in some form of an activity in order to get income (Castro, 2005). These are called multiple 
livelihoods. The hypothesis which seeks to explain this behaviour is known as the multiple 
livelihood approach. The principle of multiple livelihood approaches challenges the view that 
rural people depend solely on one activity like farming or fishing (Johnson 2013, Glavovic and 
                                                  
8 A term used to refer to members of the fishing community including traders and fishers. 
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Boonzaier 2007). The literature review points to the fact that in many fisheries, informal fish 
traders engage in other activities in addition to selling of fish (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Udong 2011, 
Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009). As rational human beings, traders 
engage in activities to help supplement and maximise their income. Like many other small-scale 
farmers in rural areas in Africa, informal fish traders pursue a diverse livelihood portfolio 
(Scoones 1992, Chambers and Conway 1992). Small scale farmers do not rely on farming only 
as a way of living. They engage in some other activities. This is so because relying on one 
activity fails to provide them with all their needs. In any case, crop production in many rural 
areas is rain fed and can only be carried on in the rainy season.  
 
3.6.2 Case studies of multiple livelihoods 
In Zimbabwe, rural farmers do not rely on crop production alone as this is not enough. They 
have other sources of income, like remittances. Unreliable rainfall can wreak havoc to their crop 
outputs (Scoones 2014).  The combinations that such farmers use are identified as the set of 
different possible livelihood strategies (Johnson 2006: 72). Historically, fishers and members of 
their households in parts of the world such as Atlantic Canada and presently in many parts of 
Africa and Asia, are also farmers, foresters, gatherers and workers in industrial or service sectors. 
Seasonal dependence on state transfer payments is also a standard element in Canadian fishers’ 
livelihood strategies (Johnson 2006: 76). In most African countries the same traders are part-time 
fishers and farmers (Kambewa et al, 2009). A study on inland communities in Burkina Faso 
found that backward and forward linkages were occurring between fishing, rice and fish farming, 
trade and craft production, including agriculture, in a clearly defined manner. Income generated 
from fishing is transferred towards non-fishing activities as a means to ultimately protect income 
from fishing (Brugère et al. 2008). Women within fishing communities take risks by investing 
money in alternative income generation activities in post-harvest activities which also increases 
their bargaining power on fishers. This is a way of hedging against vulnerability given that the 
fishery sector may suffer from stresses and shocks like seasonal variations. As a result, women 
influence the management of the fishery (Brugère et al. 2008). In Sarawak, Malaysia, from 
January until March, the peak of the monsoon period, drift/gill net fishing almost ceases, and its 
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fishermen look for other sources of income such as agriculture, logging, manufacturing and boat 
construction (Merlijn 1989). In Botswana, rural people within the Okavango Delta work on their 
land during January and February and resort to fishing during March to December (Mmopelwa 
and Ngwenya 2008). Livelihood approaches have shown that adaptation to trends, shocks and 
associated uncertainty is an important feature of household livelihoods strategies in fisheries 
(Allison and Ellis 2000, Johnson 2013). Livelihood diversification is therefore a form of 
adapting to the uncertainty of seasonal variations and unexpected shocks (Johnson 2013). 
Timmers (2012) argues that Ugandan traders migrate if fish is scarce in the areas they will be 
fishing and they would supplement income with non-fish related activities although some will 
have to go without work as they are tied up to fishing. Farmers, fishers and fish traders are 
generally encouraged to engage in multiple livelihood activities (Welcomme et al. 2010). This 
can be understood from Ellis’ assertion when the author argues that: “Engagement in a diverse 
portfolio of activities also means nurturing social networks of kin and community that enable 
such diversity to be secured and sustained” (Ellis, 2000: 3).  
 
Writing about small scale fishers in Bangladesh, Payne (2000: 4) notes that: 
On the floodplains of Bangladesh only 20–30% of the total catch is taken by full-time 
fishers. Part-timers have other occupations, often seasonal, but fisheries remain an 
essential component of their livelihoods. This is a reason to recognise the 
interdependence of fisheries with agriculture or petty trading and, therefore, the need for 
a well-integrated cross-sectoral development policy. 
 
3.7 Value Chains 
The value chain analysis seeks to identify the various actors, their functions and existing 
linkages; determine value increasing opportunities; assess the input-output structure and analyse 
the constraints and opportunities inherent in the value chain. A value chain describes the full 
range of value adding activities required to bring a product or service through the different 
phases of production; including procurement of raw materials, assembly, physical 
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transformation, and acquisition of services in response to the needs of consumers (Campbell, 
2012, Chiwaula et al, 2012; Elloumi 2004, Hellin and Meijer 2006, Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, 
Timmers 2012). A value chain is therefore the full range of activities which are required to bring 
about the product or service. The activities start from the conception, through different phases of 
production, delivery to the final consumers and final disposal after use. At each stage that the 
product or service passes through, it gains value.  
To apply this to the snoek informal traders specifically, we view their role as value adding within 
the chain of snoek as it moves from the fisherman to the final consumer. There are two routes by 
which snoek can reach the consumer. The first way is that it can go through a big dealer 
(intermediary) who buys snoek in bulk from fishers (producers) and then sells to smaller traders. 
Alternatively, the small traders can buy the fish themselves from the fisher. These two channels 
are depicted in Fig 9. 
 
Channel 1  
 
 
Channel 2 
 
 
Figure 9: The snoek value chain showing two possible routes by which the fish reaches consumers. 
Actors within the snoek value chain are skippers, fishers, traders, gear manufacturers, traders of 
fishing gear and equipment. While it is true that there is not value added to snoek per se (no 
processing is done), it will be argued here that the informal trader adds value by buying the fresh 
fish from skippers/fishers and delivering it to customers in the townships. The movement of fish 
as a commodity from one stage of the chain to another represents value addition (from the fisher 
FISHER TRADER CONSUMER 
FISHER INTERMEDIARY TRADER CONSUMER 
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to the trader and then from the trader to the customer). Fresh snoek at sea has little value to a 
customer who is in the township of Delft, more than 150 km away and is unable to travel to St 
Helena Bay to get it. There is little value addition made to the fish after it has left the fisher 
except that the fish attains what is known as place utility (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Campbell 2012). 
Snoek gets value added to it when it is transported to the townships where it is sold from the 
back of bakkies or stalls and where it is conveniently accessible to the customers. The informal 
trader links the fisher to the consumer by acting as an intermediary. One of the interesting 
features of the informal snoek value chain is that there is a very short time from harvest to final 
consumption by the consumer due to the fresh sales nature of all sales. Fish is generally sold to 
the consumers on the same day it was harvested. In such instances, post-harvest losses are almost 
non-existent (Macfadyen et al. 2011). This is viewed as an efficient distribution system and 
production is located near major areas where the fish is sold.  
In a study of women fish traders in Malaysia, Yahaya (1998 100) argues that: 
Women’s activities are critical in creating form, place and time utilities which in turn 
will have a significant impact on total fisheries production and distribution. Post-fishing 
and distribution activities undertaken by the women have ensured the persistence of low-
cost services and goods which are affordable by the local communities. 
 
Value chains are usually characterised by repetitive interactions and a certain amount of 
“organisation” linked to this. This in turn reflects the power relations or governance of the chain. 
According to a study done by Loc et al, (2010) traders contribute the lowest net added value in 
the fish value chain (17, 5%) as opposed to producers and retailers/processors and yet they 
appear to earn higher margins compared to what fishers get. People at the marketing end of the 
supply chain tend to be better off and more sophisticated than the fishermen at the production 
end (Abraham  2007). 
The application of a value chain analysis in fish value chains is very important because it will 
allow the stakeholders to understand the whole value delivery system and not only the portion of 
the value chain in which it participates and this will allow the stakeholders to gain an advantage 
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over competitors. An improved understanding of value chains can contribute to the development 
of pilot livelihood interventions because it permits constraints and opportunities to be identified 
and elucidates the governance of the marketing system (Andrew and Evans, 2009; Elloumi  
2004, Gordon et al. 2011, Chiwaula et al. 2012, Kruijssen et al.  2013, Timmers, 2012). It is only 
after understanding the fishery value chain that we can be able to formulate policies to exploit 
the potential so as to drive down income poverty and sustain them along the chain if properly 
managed. In any case, aquatic resources play an important role in fighting poverty, food security 
and rural livelihoods (Hellin and Meijer 2006, Nyeko, 2004; Ratner et al; 2012).  
3.8. Chapter summary 
In this chapter the conceptual literature review was looked at in order to gain a perspective of 
where to place the snoek traders. This also allows for a comparison of the operations of snoek 
traders and other informal traders in the developing world. Some of the interesting observations 
is that multiple livelihood strategies are employed across many facets of rural and agricultural 
economies in the developing world as communities seek to diversify activities and mitigate 
against bad weather and stresses within the systems they find themselves in. The concept of the 
informal economy tells us that people engage in it as a coping mechanism as well because of the 
lack of employment within the formal sector. Interactive governance deals with consulting all 
stakeholders on the different resources, how and when they can be exploited. This has a bearing 
on the nature of power relations existing in any given value chain. Chapter 5  will look at the 
results of this study.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the main findings of the study. It will do so by linking the theoretical 
framework to the activities which were observed in the fieldwork. A number of issues came to 
light. The social life of a typical snoek trader is briefly examined. This includes issues relating to 
the procurement of snoek, how gender is represented, governance, the state of power relations 
and employment creation within the value chain. The various roles which traders play are also 
discussed. Their functions are fairly straight forward and are not as complicated as in other 
developing countries around the world. Their interaction with skippers for most of the time 
involves buying from the boats, transporting, cutting, cleaning and packing the fish for 
customers. They are not involved in the operations of fishers at all. Governance remains a bone 
of contention in the management of traditional line fishery.  
4.2 Profiles of typical snoek traders  
Selling snoek starts at around 12 noon and ends at around 5 o’clock in the evening. Snoek traders 
say that there are not many customers before and after those times. But typically they start work 
earlier because they need to fetch the fish and travel to the selling spots. The information 
gathered indicates that most traders have been selling snoek ranging from 7 years upwards. Some 
said they had been selling for more than 15 years. There are historical reasons why traders sell 
snoek, as it has been in the family for decades. The indication was that most traders sell fish 
because their families and social networks sell fish.  Most traders did not reach Matric (Grade 
12) as an educational qualification and selling snoek is a safety net for them. Traders earn a 
living from their activities and are able to fend for their families. Many traders said that they 
were selling fish because they wanted, “to put food on the table.” They were bread winners in 
their homes and snoek trading is a viable employment option for many people. Snoek traders 
work in groups with each individual having a specific task to perform. They indicated that they 
were working as friends or relatives. Each person has a duty to perform. One person specialises 
in cutting the fish on the mat, placed on top of the open back of the bakkie door, while another 
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wraps the fish and another collects the money. The fourth person may be responsible for 
disposing the fish offal. However, there are cases where lone traders ply their trade. For the 
traders conducting their business by the roadside, owning a bakkie is a prerequisite. The bakkies 
used for selling fish belong to the bona fide fish owners. 
Some fish traders have permits issued by the municipality to sell fish in specific zones while 
others were in the process of obtaining documentation. Municipalities recognise the informal 
snoek industry and allow langanas to conduct their business as long as they do not break laws 
and ensure that they maintain clean and healthy environments on their selling spots. Snoek has 
an appeal across a range of professional people who include the private sector, government and 
municipal employees. Snoek is mostly sold on a cash basis while on rare occasions customers 
can buy fish on credit and pay later. Snoek prices fluctuate depending on the season. This has 
implications for power relations in the sense that traders will have power during intense runs of 
snoek while fishers have relatively more power when snoek was scarce. Well-resourced dealers 
are able to sell fish throughout the year since they are able buy in bulk and preserve fish in cold 
rooms. 
4.3 The auction system at landing zones 
When boats sell snoek to traders they charge the same price per fish regardless of the fish size. 
However, when traders sell the fish in the townships, they grade them according to size, charging 
less for smaller fish and more for bigger ones. A langana can have three or four grades of fish at 
any one time. Depending on fish availability and size of traders, each trader would buy anything 
from 300 fish upwards per trip. Traders are not compelled to buy from any one skipper although 
some indicated that they had some form of relationship with skippers. A boat’s entire catch of 
fish is usually sold to one buyer or group of traders. All crew members sell the entire catch at the 
same time and to the same buyers at the same prices as the auction would have established 
during the haggling and bargaining which is characteristic of snoek procurement by informal 
traders. After all the fish has been sold, the proceeds are shared on a gazat system9. Van Sittert 
(1985) argues that the share and auction systems in fisheries have origins in the 1940s. Each 
                                                  
9 Afrikaans word meaning a 50-50 split when the snoek catch is shared (Isaacs: 2013).  
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fisher surrenders half of his catch to the boat owner and keeps the other half. If the boat has a 
total crew of 8, the boat owner will get 8 halves from each fisher. He then adds all of his catch to 
his side. In practice however, all fish will be sold at the same time to one buyer and proceeds will 
be shared according to how many fish each one has landed. This has a similarity to the way the 
Fanti people of the Central Region of Ghana, conduct their business. It was found that after 
fishing has been concluded, the crew divides and shares the catch equally amongst all on board. 
An extra birefi (shares of fish) goes to the canoe, net, and motor owner (Walker 2002). This 
arrangement was different from the practices at St Helen Bay. The information gathered points to 
the fact that there are some coloured skippers, although they are few. By law and in terms of 
permit conditions, line fishers are required to land the snoek at designated bays which are 
equipped for that purpose. The landing areas roughly stretch from St Lamberts Bay to Arniston, 
a small town on the east coast. According to fishers and traders, some of the places where snoek 
is sold include Cape Point, Elands Bay, Hermanus, Hout Bay, Kalkbay, Lamberts Bay, Miller’s 
Point, Malmesbury, St. Helena, Gordon’s Bay, Stompneusbaai and Yzerfontein. There are 
several other landing sites where the fish can be landed. The choice of which landing area to buy 
snoek from depends on where the fish is running since it is highly peripatetic. Traders travel to 
any of these places to buy fish if it is available there. Landing sites always change depending on 
the time of year, weather conditions (like rain and strong wind) and fish behaviours (Croome 
2013, pers. comm.). Bad weather in the form of heavy winds and rain prevent boats from going 
fishing as the seas would be rough and dangerous. When going to landing zones, traders receive 
information from fellow traders as to which areas snoek will be running at any given time. The 
traders travel and then assemble at the landing site in the afternoons when boats start streaming 
in. Traders are free to obtain snoek supplies from any skipper who has fish. They do not have 
any contractual obligations to buy fish from particular boats or fishing crews. Fig 10 shows the 
coastal area where snoek fishing and landing takes place, from Lamberts Bay on the west coast 
to somewhere near Arniston on the south coast. 
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Figure 10: Map of the Western Cape: The coastal area where most snoek is caught and landed 
Source: Croome,  2013, Pers. Comm. 
 
4.4 Sub-contracting in selling snoek 
The field study revealed that most snoek sellers did not own the fish they were selling. They sell 
fish on behalf of principals who in turn paid them a commission. Most sellers worked in groups. 
Sub-contracting is rife in the trading of snoek. From the study done by van Sittert (1985) it can 
be seen that sub-contracting had its origins in the 1940s to 1950s when fishers were tied to 
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fishing companies. Fishing companies faced stiff competition for labour from other sectors.  
When it was dangerous to go to sea due to bad weather, fishing companies offered employees 
free accommodation and cash advances (van Sittert 1985). Such wage advances would be 
recovered when they eventually went fishing. Fishers would then be able to buy food for their 
families (kosgeld). Such arrangements ensured a constant and ready supply of labour to go to sea 
for the fishing capitalists (van Sittert 1985). Although that was to change, the foundation of sub-
contracting and subjugation had been laid.  During interviews the snoek sellers claimed that the 
business was their own. On further probing they inadvertently revealed that someone else gave 
them the fish to sell on their behalf and they did not know how much the fish had been bought 
for. Selling snoek also appeared to be a safety net for some traders who were undergoing 
rehabilitation after they had had a brush with the law and for others who may have been 
retrenched from formal employment. In as far as fishers are concerned, skippers wield a lot of 
power. Sub-contracting often involved a dual process: first between the skipper and the company 
and secondly between the skipper and individual crew members (van Sittert 1985). 
4.5 The snoek value chain 
A value chain describes the full range of value adding activities required to bring a product or 
service through the different phases of production, including the procurement of raw materials, 
assembly, physical transformation, and acquisition of services in response to the needs of 
consumers (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001). Snoek traders however, do not add value to the fish per 
se. Their role is to add what is called ‘place utility’ to the fish; by transporting snoek from the 
landing bays to customers they are able to provide - their customers with access to the fish 
nearby. Consumers do not need to travel to the sea to buy fish for themselves. When they sell 
snoek, they cut and pack it for their customers, which is another aspect of value addition to the 
fish. 
4.5.1 Selling snoek on credit 
Most traders indicated that they have regular customers who buy snoek from them. Such 
customers may be given fish on credit because of a strong bond that developed over a period of 
time. This finding is underpinned by a case study done in Moree, Ghana, as observed by Overa 
(1993: 121), which is described below:  
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At the fish market in Kumasi, small scale traders sell fish to by-passers, but those with 
long experience and those who trade on a larger scale, have regular customers to whom 
they sell on credit, and thus long lasting trading relationships develop.  
 
But for the most part, snoek traders pointed out that they rarely extend credit to customers. This 
point is in line with some findings of a study conducted on the south-eastern arm of Lake Malawi 
(Kambewa et al. 2009). For most of the time snoek is sold on a cash basis because the money 
should buy new fish stock for the next trading day. The reason could be that their principals (who 
sub-contract the actual snoek sellers) want the proceeds of the trade at the end of each business 
day.  
4.5.2 Selling by the roadside 
The main way of selling fish was by the roadside with fish stacked on the back of bakkies. Most 
of the bakkies are old cars which have outlived their usefulness. It is not surprising that their 
vehicles are in that state since snoek, being a marine product, causes metallic bodies to rust 
because of the oxidation caused by saline moisture dripping from the fish. There are no typical 
fish markets in South Africa as opposed to other countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Malawi (DFID 2006). Trading areas studied in South Africa lacked legislative 
control and basic trading amenities like a water supply and cold storage facilities (DFID 2006). 
This observation is contrary to the studies done in Kampala in Uganda, Lagos in Nigeria and Dar 
es Salaam in Tanzania, where traders sell fish on fixed stalls and designated points or markets 
(Ogbe et al. 2009, Reynolds and Kirema-Mukasa 1991). Observations in South Africa were that 
only a handful of sites were officially designated to sell fish within the Cape Town metropolitan 
areas, namely Hout Bay, Grassy Park and Mitchell’s Plain.  
 
4.5.3 Snoek price variations  
The peak time for snoek runs was identified as the period between May and July. Snoek is 
mainly a winter species, at its best during the months of May to August, although it is sold 
throughout the year (Isaacs 2013). Investigations revealed that during the snoek peak times, 
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prices tumble to as low as R5 per fish at the sea while traders would charge R15 when delivered 
to residential areas. That would happen for a few weeks before prices firmed. At the time of this 
study (October 2012), prices per snoek were ranging from R30 (for very small snoek) to R80 (for 
large snoek). It also depended on the places where the fish was being sold. Lone traders who sell 
at positions away from other snoek traders tended to charge higher prices than those within close 
proximity to each other. Snoek prices were lowest at Mitchell’s Plain and Hout Bay. 
Incidentally, these two centres happen to have a high concentration of traders who are housed in 
stalls built for that purpose by the local authority.   
 
4.6 The roles played by snoek traders  
Snoek traders are important players within the snoek value chain. Amongst other functions, 
traders also clear fresh fish at the landing zones and help fishers to avoid the burden of seeking 
storage for the fish.  
4.6.1 Buying snoek 
Depending on where the snoek runs occur, langanas can purchase snoek a few kilometres from 
where they live or they have to travel tens of kilometres away from their residential areas to 
acquire fresh fish from boats. Traders buy freshly caught fish at the places of landing which are 
dotted all over the Western Cape coast.  
4.6.2 Selling snoek  
Traders bring the fish to the customers in township areas, where most of the fish is sold from the 
back of pick-up trucks. The core business is to buy and sell fresh snoek. However, in some cases 
snoek is sold dried, frozen and smoked, although most customers prefer it fresh. Mmopelwa and 
Ngwenya (2008) had the same finding from a study conducted within the Okavango Delta in 
Botswana where the citizens preferred to buy fresh rather than smoked or dried fish (Mmopelwa 
and Ngwenya  2008). 
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A trader cuts snoek for waiting customers at a Lentegeur Mall stall in Mitchell’s Plain. In the foreground, fish roe 
and cut heads can be seen. The orange bucket behind the seller is for fish waste disposal. This fish waste being sold 
for R50 each and weighed about 1,5kg.  
Source: P. Mubaiwa 
 
 
Father and son helping each other run the snoek selling business from the back of a bakkie by the roadside in 
Mitchell’s Plain. A mat on which fish is cut can be seen to the left, with a butcher’s knife on top. 
Source: P. Mubaiwa 
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A trader cutting, cleaning and preparing fish at a roadside stall in Strandfontein. This trader was selling three species 
– snoek (Thyrsites atun), Hottentot (Pachymetopon blochii) and sardine (Sardinops sagax) on the same stall. 
Source: P. Mubaiwa 
 
4.7 Langanas and multiple livelihood strategies 
It was observed that some snoek traders sell fruit from the same bakkies from which they sell 
fish. Such activities can be both ex-ante risk management measures (pro-active initiatives in 
advance) and those that are ex-post coping mechanisms that attempt to facilitate a move back out 
of poverty, which are reactive initiatives following some unforeseen shock to or crisis for the 
household strategy (FAO 2005). However, even though multiple livelihood strategies need to be 
encouraged, not all of them can be positive or cumulative. Several traders indicated that they 
would sell fruit and vegetables when snoek was off peak. One of the interviews was conducted 
on a vegetable stall in Delft where snoek was being distributed to various sellers who were sub-
contracted by a wealthy langana woman. Each of the sellers was given a bakkie to use for the 
business. The woman counted the fish given to each trader. After the sellers had left the woman 
went back to concentrate on selling fruit which was abundantly on display at a shop. The facility 
was equipped with a cold room. Some traders indicated that they would sell fruit and vegetables 
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on the same sites where they sold fish. Yet others said that they would opt to stay at home if they 
did not have stock. Some langanas said that when there was less snoek on the market, they would 
go and buy fish from Snoek Wholesalers, Irvin & Johnson or Sea Harvest to re-sell at their usual 
spots. A marked difference between snoek traders and fish traders elsewhere was that the 
livelihood strategies employed by snoek traders in Cape Town were linked to diversity within the 
urban environments owing to the fact that they operated within urban areas. In most Sub-Saharan 
African countries, informal fish traders live in rural areas and also depend on crop farming (Béné 
et al. 2010b). Such traders turn to farming as the next best livelihood alternative, unlike in Cape 
Town which is the second largest urban metropolitan centre in South Africa. Snoek traders may 
lack the knowledge and drive to engage in farming activities. Even though there is a sizeable 
number of coloured farm workers in the Western Cape, most fish traders indicated that they had 
a strong family tradition in selling snoek and possessed little or no farming knowledge. Traders 
would not say whether or not they would embark on farming if snoek was not available. They 
may also lack the expertise to do other jobs apart from selling fish, since some families appeared 
to have specialised in selling fish. The availability of cultivable land could also be the limiting 
factor within such fishing communities (Béné et al. 2010b). Many of these informal traders are 
involved in other income-generating activities like driving taxis, selling fruit and vegetables, and 
running shebeens (outlets for selling alcohol, either legally or illegally), thus moving in and out 
of the fishery, depending on the fish supply and the time of year (Isaacs 2013). Traders also rely 
on state grants to boost their household incomes (DAFF 2012b).  
4.8 Power relations within the snoek fishery 
Studies done on small scale fishing communities in developing countries showed that women 
traders usually wield a lot of power over fishers. In the suki relationship in the Philippines for 
example, a trader provides the fisher with a guaranteed market for his fish and gives capital to 
the fisher. In return, the fisher will be expected to provide the trader with a steady supply of fish 
(Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011).  In Ghana, fish traders known as “konkofo” also pre-finance fishing 
trips and then purchase fish from the fishers they financed. The “konkofo” may even supply 
fishers with fuel, gas, kerosene and food to secure the boat’s catch. One fish mother can support 
several fishers (Gordon et al. 2011). “It is this ability to command funds that gives fish mothers 
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unique access to fish catches and why they are able to collectively influence fish prices” (Gordon 
et al, 2011  21). To the contrary, this study’s findings showed that snoek traders in the Western 
Cape are not necessarily more powerful than fishers. In the Western Cape snoek traders 
specialise in selling snoek and do not perform any other functions which are ancillary to the 
activities of fishers. Snoek traders are not generally involved in fishing activities. There is 
usually a clear distinction between a fisher and a trader. Their activities and occupations do not 
normally overlap into others’ domain. Most traders said that they would not want to be involved 
in fishing at all. They envisage their role as buying and selling of fish.  They seem to apply the 
economic principle of specialisation and division of labour. A fisher’s job is to catch fish, and 
nothing else. Either one has to be a fisher or a trader, not both. Each party is not involved in 
another party’s business activities. In any case, fishers and traders are more or less strangers 
when it comes to the buying and selling of fish at the landing zones. Snoek fishers fund their 
business operations independently from traders.  
 
It was observed that most boat owners are mostly white and are well resourced and command 
wealth whose genesis may be traced back to the apartheid era. Apartheid made it possible for the 
ownership of the means of production (boats) to be in the hands of the white man while the 
fishermen would be black or coloured (Martin and Nielsen 1996, Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 
1998). After docking at St Helena Bay, it was observed that boats were hauled out of the water 
and loaded onto trailers using 4X4 trucks which were driven by mostly white men. Almost 80% 
of skippers were white and 83% of them owned their own boats (McGrath et al. 1997).  
 
They own the means of production (boats, accessories and bait) and earn higher incomes than 
their crew, whose earnings barely exceed the poverty datum line. As such, there is no leeway in 
which white skippers or boat owners can request pre-financing from langanas. Most langanas are 
historically disadvantaged individuals anyway. When a study was carried out in the village of 
Arniston (Western Cape) it was found that the situation is still characterized by a de facto 
segregation of white and coloured people living within the fishing community. Sverdrup-Jensen 
and Nielsen (1998: 8) observed that, “Whites mostly assume the role of boat owner/skipper 
whereas the Coloureds usually work as fishing crew.” The village of Arniston is a fishing 
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community in the Western Cape in the Southeast Cape with about 800 inhabitants (Martin and 
Nielsen 1996).  
 
Snoek traders do not preside over fishers because the buying of fish at landing zones is through 
the auction system. The system is so transparent that virtually anyone who wants to buy fish can 
do so as long as the price being asked for is agreed upon. The highest bidder gets the catch. From 
the face of it, fishers and traders did not know each other. They were merely conducting a 
business transaction. In the snoek fishery the nature of transactions conducted points to a “zero 
sum game” for all players concerned. The picture is different if the findings from other places of 
the world are anything to go by. Informal traders in some parts of the world lack access to capital 
to fund their operations and get sponsored by traders. They are required to sell all the fish to the 
“financiers” who may dictate the price of the catch. Observations done at St Helena Bay showed 
boats coming in, with potential buyers waiting on the shoreline. Most boats were small and could 
accommodate six to ten fishers. The auction system which was used to sell fish was transparent 
and fair. An auction allows buyers and sellers to reach agreement on a price by bidding and the 
highest bidder takes the goods or service at stake.  
4.9 Linkages between the informal snoek traders and the formal sector 
The underground model acknowledges that the informal sector exists and has links with the 
formal sector. During the research it was revealed that some innovative informal traders 
possessing an aura of success, supply fish to formal establishments like fish and chips shops on a 
regular basis. In turn, after they have been paid, the snoek traders acquire products which have 
been produced by the formal economy. Such products include fuel, ice, and personal consumer 
products for themselves and their dependants. Some of their customers are also employed 
formally or work in formal public and private sectors despite serving hordes of unemployed 
customers or those who are working within the informal economy. Applying the concept of 
informal sector to small-scale fisheries in general (as a conceptual principle), it is argued that 
small scale fisheries employ 95% of the men and women engaged in the sector, and more than 
90% of these operate in developing countries (FAO  2007). These small scale fisheries activities 
are carried out informally since there is widespread informality in their operations.  
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4.10 Gender dynamics within the snoek fishery 
From the observations made and information gathered, female snoek fishers are virtually non-
existent. Fishers interviewed indicated that female fishers are likely to fail to cope with the 
physical rigours of catching this fish species.  After a fish has been hauled out of the water, the 
neck of the caught snoek must be broken before the hook can be safely removed. Failure to do 
that on time may allow the fish to deliver a blood-thinning toxin with its bite (Norton 2013). Fish 
is slippery and will wriggle, trying to free itself from capture. This requires skill and endurance 
to put it down. Taking too long trying to catch snoek will reduce the fish’s quality into what is 
known as pap fish. Pap fish is as soft as pap or mealie-meal porridge. It derives its meaning from 
the tendency of snoek flesh to turn soft (Norton 2013). As soon as a snoek is dead, the fisher 
must work hard to prevent its flesh turning into an undesirable mush. Pap fish is difficult to sell 
since it is shunned by many. Most pap snoek is smoked. Some traders give pap fish away for 
free while others smoke or dry it.  
 
While on fishing trips, fishers also have to relieve themselves in the open on the boat, insensible 
to their fellow fishermen’s presence. While a study by the City of Cape Town showed that black 
South Africans and women are over-represented within this sector (Siqwana-Ndulo 2013, 
Skinner  2013, Chen  2001, SESE, Stats SA  2014), results within the snoek value chain point to 
a somewhat different picture. In the 1940s men were forced to provide labour to the South 
African Sea Products (SASP) while women were required to work in the factories for fish (van 
Sittert 1985).  Women fisherfolk within the snoek value chain were lowly represented and a few 
were working as traders. However a significant number of women were playing an active role as 
traders at the Mitchell’s Plain, Lentegeur Mall, and Hout Bay fish markets (fixed stalls provided 
by the municipality). There was one case where a crew of women sold along Robert Sobukwe 
Road in Bellville. They were equally nimble-fingered as they went about the slicing and cutting 
of fish. Added to that, it became clear in this thesis that the job of selling fish in most Southern 
African communities was predominantly a man’s job (Chiwaula et al. 2012, Mmopelwa and 
Ngwenya 2008, Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen  1998) and yet women dominated the scene in 
West Africa (Overa  1993, Olufayo  2012, Udong  2011). In the words of an Eerste River trader, 
snoek trade is “a man thing,” (Ulrich: 2012). 
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4.11 Contribution to food security 
Snoek is a much needed source of protein in Cape Town. Low income and working class citizens 
are able to get valuable nutrients at affordable prices. Added to that, langanas also supply their 
immediate families with fish. To draw parallels with the Nigerian case study, it was noted that 
women fish traders in Nigeria contribute significantly to the nutritional needs of their families 
Olufayo (2012). Small-scale fisheries generally make broader direct and indirect contributions to 
food security as compared to larger-scale fisheries that make affordable fish available and 
accessible to poor populations and are a key means to sustain the livelihoods of marginalized and 
vulnerable populations in developing countries (HLPE 2014). Langanas sell snoek at prices 
which are about 40% lower than the prices that supermarkets charge (Isaacs 2013). Their prices 
are low because they buy directly from fishers and deliver to the markets and they do not have 
costs associated with refrigeration, processing and packaging. In that sense, langanas play an 
important role as they make the fish affordable for low income and working class township 
residents (Hara 2014). Snoek can be cooked in several ways, e.g. deep-fried, boiled, 
microwaved, grilled or baked (Isaacs 2013). Findings indicated that snoek is also eaten with fried 
potato chips.  
 
It came to light that during Easter the selling of any type of fish and fish products will be brisk, 
particularly in township communities. This is linked to the fact that those people who are 
Christians eat fish as a religious sacrament which is linked to the biblical account of Jesus 
Christ's miracle of feeding a multitude of five thousand people with five loaves and two fish. 
Norton (2013) argues that fish is a traditional meal during Easter and this occasion is even bigger 
than Christmas for many communities, where fish, especially “kerrievis” or curried fish, is the 
main item on the menu. Snoek products range from fresh whole fish, to fish that has been gutted, 
filleted, or salted and smoked (Isaacs 2013); fish roe is also a popular delicacy.  
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4.12 Clearing the fish market 
Some authors have concluded that the primary goal of informal fish traders is to meet the 
demand for fish (and hence provide food security) within their immediate communities since 
there are no post-harvest facilities and yet the fish will need to be disposed of quickly, owing to 
perishability (Abraham  2007, Diei–Ouadi and Mgawe  2011, Jacinto and Pomeroy  2011). This 
may be viewed as a win-win situation as traders are able to minimise spoilage and customers 
have access to a fresh product with which to feed their families. Fishers will have their fish stock 
cleared and traders have fish to sell and earn margins. At the same time households will get food 
on their tables to feed families. 
 
4.13 Snoek traders as entrepreneurs 
A snoek trader possesses an entrepreneurial spirit since he or she assumes and absorbs the 
inherent risks that come with selling fish. Fishers are less exposed to market fluctuations because 
traders take more risks in transporting the fish to the markets (Loc et al. 2010). Fish traders offer 
a very important service to the fishers who cannot be fishers and traders at the same time 
(Basurto et al. 2012). When buying snoek, the traders travel to the landing areas where they buy 
fresh fish from the skippers. They are faced with the conundrum of the ever rising costs of fuel.  
A trader periodically bears higher risks than fishers themselves, i.e. risks associated with 
spoilage, low prices on the market, non-payment of debts and they have to mitigate against such 
adverse events (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011). The fact that they bear higher risks than fishers 
probably explains why they get higher margins than fishers within the fish value chain (Chiwaula 
2012). Langanas have to contend with competition amongst themselves and some unforeseen 
unpredicted incidents that may occur within the markets and wreck their business operations. 
 
4.14 Employment generation 
The activities which are pursued by langanas create jobs by hiring people who sell snoek as sub-
contracted agents. This is a critical function, given the high levels of unemployment in South 
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Africa. Some of the contracted individuals fail to get alternative employment elsewhere and 
participating within the snoek value chain is the best activity they can do. A few sellers indicated 
that they had served time within the penal system. That means that it is not easy for them to get 
hired elsewhere as some employers require clean records for potential employees. The snoek 
trade becomes a safety net for them. Some snoek traders indicated that they have worked within 
the snoek selling business all their lives and had never done any other job. They learned the 
ropes since they were young until they became professional snoek sellers. This implies that the 
snoek value chain with the right governance is a stable, sustainable and reliable source of 
livelihood. It is clear that most traders are breadwinners in their families. Langanas as 
entrepreneurs are able to support themselves and look after their dependants. It might mean that 
such traders do not really lack alternative forms of employment if they have been selling snoek 
for more than 20 years as indicated by some. Some snoek traders work as families and employ 
and lure their kith and kin into this industry.  
 
4.15 Consumer convenience  
“…the real snoek hunters take to the streets” (Ken Liffiton as quoted by Norton, 2013 3). This 
quote may be interpreted to mean that serious snoek sellers need to conduct their business in the 
streets if they are to derive sustainable livelihoods in this industry. Snoek traders constitute the 
first stage within the snoek marketing chain since they are the people who buy fresh fish directly 
from line fishers and sell to the respective communities in the formerly exclusive coloured 
townships to the south east of the Cape Town Central Business District. It takes a lot of ingenuity 
to wake up early and drive from Delft to say, St Helena Bay, haggle for fish with fishers, pay for 
it and drive back and arrive with the fresh fish in time for cooking.  
Langanas focus on the smaller market segments (niche marketing) for which their small 
businesses are best suited. In the same light snoek traders’ existence is of significance as they 
serve a market composed of poor working class residents in the townships of the south eastern 
parts of Cape Town.  Township dwellers, as citizens of this world have a right to food that 
provide nutrients which come from marine products like snoek. They provide a much needed 
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service of bringing fresh snoek to their customers, close to where they live. As the case with the 
sole trader economic theory, informal snoek traders are a convenient way of shopping for snoek 
since fresh fish is conveniently brought almost next to the consumer’s door step. The customers 
are given the privilege of choosing what they want. The fish is cut to the customers’ 
specifications while they are waiting. This is indeed an important role.  
 
4.16 Chapter Summary 
The roles which are performed by informal snoek traders are there for all to see. Traders travel to 
the designated landing zones. They buy fresh fish and transport it to the townships. They cut and 
remove fish offal for the customers. Traders pack the fish for the waiting customer. They also 
deal with other fish species if snoek is scarce and also during certain occasions. While pursuing 
their business, traders sub-contract and create employment for other citizens. Snoek traders are 
important entrepreneurs as they generate employment and in most instances snoek sellers operate 
as teams of at least two individuals making it labour intensive. The availability of snoek helps in 
the provision of food security in the impoverished coloured communities, where it is eaten most. 
This study shows that governance is key in ensuring that the previously disadvantaged fishers 
and traders are able to access sea products in an equitable manner. The findings indicate that 
most traders are relatively illiterate and this may be the reason why they sell fish instead of 
working in other sectors of the economy. The auction system used is a very fair way of arriving 
at a price and avoids the exploitation of one group by another. There are linkages between 
informal traders and the formal sector in the sense that both sides can supply snoek to each other, 
depending on whether the fish is off-season or not. The gender composition in the informal 
snoek fishery shows that men dominate this particular value chain. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
5.1  Features which threaten snoek traders’ livelihoods  
As actors within the informal economy, it would be unimaginable that snoek sellers are not 
without challenges. Isaacs (2006b) noted that small scale fishers and indeed snoek traders face 
several challenges in their operations. Removal of limitations to their operations would mean 
greater access to resources and hence higher performance, and more food and livelihood secure 
households (Udong et al. 2009). Some of the challenges they face are briefly discussed here. 
5.2 Lack of transparent governance within traditional line fishery 
New approaches to governance within fisheries call for imaginative interactions along the lines 
suggested by the interactive governance perspective as espoused by some authors (Jentoft 2013, 
Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Jentoft (2013) points out that a system-to-be-governed that has 
inherent inequities and justice disparities among its components is likely to experience tensions 
and conflicts that can cause lack of cooperation and resistance to governing interventions. Such a 
system needs to be accountable and be able to acknowledge its failures and it must be prepared 
to address problems within its area of influence. Terminologies such as ‘pro-poor’, ‘people 
centred’ and ‘responsive to the poor’ only make sense if decisions are being made together with 
the poor (Onyango, 2011  35). Hauck (2008) argues that governance in fisheries must also allow 
for redistributive justice and procedural justice. The latter type of justice is very important in 
fisheries because it gives legitimacy to the fisheries governance process. Legitimacy follows 
from the fact that if people are allowed to have their voice heard they will feel that they have 
been treated fairly and they get satisfied with decision makers (Jentoft 2013). As a result, lately 
there has been a shift in many countries towards co-governance and participatory approaches in 
natural resource management. As the HLPE (2014) acknowledges, there is a need for better, 
more inclusive governance so as to establish governance systems that are more aware of these 
various dimensions of the problem, allowing and empowering stakeholders to engage actively in 
decision-making processes, in appropriate management mechanisms and rights definitions, 
 
 
 
 
 90 
 
towards making end-users become responsible stewards of the resources (HLPE 2014). The 
reasoning behind such an approach is that stakeholder participation is likely to improve 
compliance, which is an urgent problem in fisheries worldwide and a major reason why so many 
fish stocks are in peril. It is assumed that participation increases the legitimacy of governing 
systems and hence the willingness of stakeholders to follow the rules and accept outcomes 
(Jentoft 2013). 
 
Governance frameworks within fisheries should be enhanced for the benefit of fisheries 
stakeholders. The difficulty that has been observed worldwide with the implementation of 
fisheries and aquaculture regulations suggests that effective governance is an on-going struggle 
that necessitates adaptation and improvement. Writing on the continued poaching of perlemoen,  
de Greef (2014) argues that many of the residents of Hangberg, a small fishing town in Hout 
Bay, outside Cape Town, have turned to poaching as an alternative, rejecting a formal system 
that continues to overlook their interests.  De Greef describes perlemoen as a big kelp-grazing 
sea snail which is commonly known as abalone, which is considered to be a delicacy and a status 
symbol in Asia where its flesh can fetch thousands of dollars a kilogram (de Greef 2014).  
Despite years of it being officially banned within the area, the illegal harvesting of abalone 
continues. The poaching of abalone has created elites within the community who are driving 
fancy cars acquired from the proceeds of poaching activities of the endangered marine resource 
(de Greef 2014). It is argued that such South Africans feel betrayed by the democratic 
government on its failure to address the injustices of apartheid. This assertion seems to be 
generally true in South Africa in the minds of many previously disadvantaged individuals who 
have developed the spirit of entitlement. The endless violent service delivery protests are also 
testimony to this mistrust. Fishers and traders yearn to be heard by the authorities. One female 
fish trader at Hout Bay said that she did not bother to apply for fishing rights because she did not 
have any hope of getting any because of corruption. She said that she lost confidence in the way 
rights were allocated and said that only the politically connected got them. To confirm her fears, 
it was alleged that fishing rights allocations conducted by the DAFF for small scale fishers had 
not been done in a transparent way in January 2014. Coastal Links, an organisation which 
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represents fishermen in the West Coast town of Paternoster, said that its members have no faith 
in the current government (Eye Witness News 2014). 
 
5.3  Lack of infrastructure  
One challenge which was constantly highlighted by roadside snoek traders was the lack of a 
suitable infrastructure for them to conduct their business. They indicated that they required 
physical stalls with sources of clean water to make their job easier and to work in a hygienic 
manner.  
5.4  High levels of illiteracy  
In the majority of cases in African countries, high illiteracy levels pervade fishing communities 
(Chiwaula et al. 2012, Isaacs 2006b, Tekanene 2004, Weeratunge and Snyder 2009, Jacinto and 
Pomeroy 2011). Most Western Cape inhabitants to the south east of the Cape Town speak 
Afrikaans as their home language but they are able to communicate in English which is 
considered by many as their second language. During this research, snoek traders professed 
ignorance on the existence of a draft SSF policy which had been drafted by the DAFF and aimed 
at benefiting small players to enter the sector. It is however, difficult for illiterate people who are 
working within the informal economy to embark on further education when their existence is 
survivalist in outlook (Becker 2004).  
5.5  Lack of access to credit 
A Survey of Employers and the Self-employed SESE) conducted by Statistics SA showed that 
many of those who operated informal businesses and did not use their own money to start their 
businesses, borrowed the money from friends and relatives (SESE, Stats SA 2014). The lack of 
access to credit for small scale fishers and traders restricts the maximum participation of fishing 
communities within the economies of their respective countries (Gordon et al. 2011, Isaacs 
2006a, Kambewa et al. 2009, Kleih et al. 2006, Loc et al.  2010). In fishing communities it is 
difficult to access capital to start or expand businesses. Social networks could enable them to 
access resources for them to pursue livelihood activities (Weeratunge and Snyder 2009, Udong et 
al. 2009). Fishing communities do not possess assets which banks accept to be used as collateral. 
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The unavailability of formal credit to informal traders is further constrained by the fact that a 
savings culture rarely exists in fishing communities because of the perception that there is always 
fish to catch and also that options to save money through financial institutions may be limited 
(Chiwaula et al. 2012, Kleih et al. 2006). In any case, the income they make is small, such that it 
becomes difficulty to save. Snoek traders are thus unable to participate fully within the lucrative 
trawling sector. It is insurmountable for small players like langanas to own multimillion dollar 
trawling vessels as the costs of acquiring such plants and equipment are prohibitive. A small 
number of large corporations have a virtual monopoly in this sector with Irvin & Johnson and 
Sea Harvest holding 75% of the quotas between them (Martin and Nielsen 1996). Added to that, 
the two companies are vertically integrated, meaning that they control the whole value chain, 
which include fishing gear manufacture, fish trawling, processing and sales (Heistein 2011). This 
leaves little scope for new small scale producers to penetrate such networks.  
5.6  Lack of organisation 
Sometimes small scale fishers and traders generally lack organisation amongst themselves. It 
would be to their advantage for informal traders and fishers to be organised so that they could 
form cooperatives or associations. At their best, cooperatives have the means to pool resources 
and establish their own marketing channels which promote their interests. The benefits of 
organisation have been shown in West Africa and South East Asia (Gordon 2011, IFAD 1999, 
NORAD FAO Project 2012, Walker 2002). As a result, they fail to lobby and advocate for their 
rights. While there are many organisations within the fishing industry in South Africa, there are 
few which are aimed at the poor fishers and their comrades - the snoek traders (Isaacs 2006a, 
2013). In some parts of Nigeria and Ghana women fish traders are members of associations 
which seek to protect and advance their own interests. The poor usually suffer from a low level 
of socio-political organisation and their capacity to make their voices heard is as a consequence 
weak, resulting in exclusion from political and decision-making processes (Béné 2003). It is 
generally agreed in the literature that the establishment of associations and cooperatives among 
fishing communities would bring about benefits to all fisherfolk. Furthermore, the issue of 
fragmentation is crucial to addressing problems arising from the nature of fisheries as common 
pool resources. Property rights are not in place and rules which govern the sustainable use of 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
fishing grounds are non-existent or not enforced, leading to a situation known as an open-access 
situation, which is known as the “tragedy of the commons” (Jacinto and Pomeroy 2011, Hardin  
1968). As Jacinto and Pomeroy (2011: 162) contend: 
By organising into a cooperative, fishers are able to have greater control over their 
product, obtain a wide variety of services and have greater bargaining power than an 
individual fisher would have. 
 
In the fishing industry in South Africa, the failure of the workforce to unionise then was a result 
of the fragmentation of the labour force in the 1940s (van Sittert 1985). Within the snoek fishing 
area, fishers had shown that they did not favour unionisation since the days of the SASP (van 
Sittert 1985).  
The nature of employment revolves around the skipper who they try to please so that they could 
retain their jobs.  Skippers are usually employed by companies owning the boats and exist as 
“labour aristocracy” and play a crucial role in the control of the work force. Capitalism, to some 
extent, operates by sub-contracting exploitation and management (van Sittert 1985). Payment to 
crew members depends on the amount of snoek harvested and this often causes intense 
competition between crew members. As a matter of fact, fishers compete against each other and 
cause suspicions amongst crewmen and the skipper and his crew (van Sittert 1985). Although sea 
products are enjoyed by the rich and poor alike, in the words of Sir Walter Scott, “It’s not fish ye 
re buying. It’s men’s lives” (van Sittert 1985). Traders, like the fishers, operate individually and 
are fragmented.  
5.7 Sustainable management of fisheries 
The management of fisheries should be prioritised in such a way that snoek actors are able to 
participate fully in the economic activities, particularly of the Western Cape and South Africa in 
general. Brugère et al. (2008) argue that fisheries management plans should also be broadly 
integrated into national development plans, associated in particular with credit, education and 
employment policies to ensure that the right balance between household diversification and 
resource conservation is reached. 
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5.8 Snoek trade and gender 
This research indicates that there is minimal participation by women within the trading of snoek. 
Gender equality should be insisted upon to increase women’s participation within the snoek 
value chain. Women must be empowered and capacitated so that they can play more active roles 
within the snoek value chain. This should be a priority as women can and are able to improve 
their living standards and those of their dependants. Increased women’s participation in 
agriculture has been seen to increase productivity and food availability to their households. Some 
authors argue that women are less prone to corruption as compared to men (ACRN 2010, Esarey  
and Schwindt-Bayer  2014, Esarey and Chirillo  2013). 
5.9 Transformation within the fisheries sector 
It is the view of the researcher that that affirmative action and transformation within the fisheries 
sector in South Africa is required. Such changes should and must take place to improve the lives 
of the previously disadvantaged individuals, most of whom are inhabitants of the Cape Flats. 
Meaningful transformation should help the community to access fishery resources on an equal 
footing with the already established operators. This should help reduce poverty and make fish 
more accessible to those who require it most. Transformation helps to stem mistrust and 
uncertainty within the various racial groups in the Western Cape Province. South Africa has 
some of the world’s widest gaps in terms of income and living conditions. These gaps require 
radical transformation to narrow it to acceptable limits. Fisheries management and planning 
theory recommends that transformation should be done in a way which takes care of shocks and 
stresses within the value chains. If done in a haphazard manner, transformation can result in 
unemployment and fish shortages and fish price increases which can harm the very people that it 
seeks to conciliate. Property rights and the rule of law should be embraced whenever 
transformative processes are taking shape. If real transformation fails to produce tangible 
benefits for the poor and working class populace, it is likely to increase mistrust between the 
rulers and the ruled.  
 
After getting impatient with the newly elected democratic government, in 1996 Andy Johnston, a 
Cape Town activist led a group of protestors into the Parliament of South Africa. The group was 
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protesting against the persistence of apartheid rules for allocating, capturing and exporting fish 
and shellfish resources. Salo (2007: 2) quotes Johnston as having said,  
"Informal fishers had become disenchanted with the ability of the ANC government to 
change the corrupt, inhuman and bureaucratic apartheid fisheries policies and our actions 
on that day were part of a renewed defiance campaign, the scorched-sea campaign, to 
protest the continuation of legal practices that transformed the high protein fish food our 
poor coastal communities rely upon, into paper. Green paper. With a dollar sign on it.”  
The researcher argues that authorities should be proactive and not be reactive when it comes to 
transformation issues. 
5.10 Conclusion 
It is clear from this study that informal snoek traders play important roles within the political and 
social economy of the Western Cape. Fishers’ activities provide nutrition to many households 
and help fight hunger. Traders’ activities also help create employment and mitigate against the 
high unemployment levels in South Africa. I argue that traders should be capacitated so that they 
are able to operate more efficiently in delivering their mandate and enable local communities to 
derive maximum benefit from the resource.  
It is noted that informal traders have links with formal entities. This linkage should be 
strengthened so that at some stage the traders may formalise their operations so that they are able 
to participate fully within this fishery. It was revealed that for the most part, snoek traders have 
been in the business for a long time and their involvement may span several generations. The 
provision of support mechanisms and capacity building are needed since the snoek trade is a 
viable employment alternative which can create a host of multipliers in both down and upstream. 
This study should be in a position of making us aware of several aspects embodying the snoek 
value chain. It gives insights into the gender dynamics within the value chain, as well as the need 
for a concerted effort to eliminate these glaring disparities, so that both men and women get an 
equal share of the cake.  
Governance within the traditional line fishery in the Western Cape should be conducted in a 
transparent manner. Fishers and traders live from hand to mouth and are disillusioned by the fact 
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that white citizens dominate this space. While there is no need to grab fishing rights from white 
citizens, a balance needs to be struck so that all groups across the social spectrum benefit from 
the marine resources. Authorities should seek to balance the act by ensuring that real 
transformation takes place with the poverty stricken fishers and traders. Reforms must benefit all 
the intended groups. This requires a mechanism where the politically connected and elites do not 
hijack the programme. Without that, the communities will continue to feel that they are being 
segregated and will end up taking the law into their own hands to claim what they feel belongs to 
them. In conclusion, traders should organise themselves into associations. Instead of coming 
together, they are alienated and antagonistically compete against each other. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
University of the Western Cape 
Project Questionnaire on the role played by Snoek Traders in Cape Town 
Name of Student: Pasipanodya Mubaiwa 
Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) 
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences 
Section A:  Respondent Demographics  
Age                            
 
Gender     Male   Female 
 
Marital status    Married Single   
Divorced  Separated 
 
Number of children   
 
Other dependents (please specify) ________________________________ 
 
Level of education   __________________________________ 
Section B:   Themes 
Historical Background: 
1. When did you start selling fish? 
2. How did you become a fish trader? 
 
Fishing Activity: 
3. Do you ever perform any of the following activities? 
(a) Lending money to fishers 
(b) Pre-financing fishing trips to fishers 
(c) Funding fishers to buy fishing gear 
(d) Hire out a boat and fishing gear to fishers  
(e) Having automatic rights over the catch of fishers you lend money to? 
 
Buying Fish: 
4. Where do you buy fish?  
5. How far do you travel? 
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6. What does it cost to get to the fish and back? 
7. Explain the negotiation process? 
8. Do you buy from the same fishers, boats? 
9. Do you buy frozen snoek? 
10. Do you buy snoek from the wholesalers Snoekies in Landsdowne Road? 
11. Do you only sell snoek or other fish or other goods? 
12. What are the other livelihood activities? 
13. What other work do you do to supplement your income apart from selling fish? 
14. Where did you get money as startup capital for selling of snoek? 
15. What other fish species do you sell? 
16. If selling snoek fails what would be the next best alternative occupation would you pursue and 
why? 
17. Do you always use cash when buying fish from fishers? 
18. How much do you buy fish from fishers? 
19. How do you come to an acceptable price of fish with the fishers? 
20. Who is more powerful in price determination a fisher or a trader? 
21. When buying fish what unit of measurement do you use? 
22. Do you always buy fish from the same fishers? 
23. Do you have any relatives who are fishers and who you buy fish from? 
24. Are you bothered at all with the competition that comes from big retailers and New Zealand? Do 
you buy snoek/barracouta caught off the coast of New Zealand?   
Please 
explain………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………. 
25. How many fish do you buy on average per day? And sell per day? 
26. Do you own the transport that you use when buying and selling fish? 
27. How much of the fish you sell is eaten to your house? 
28. Do you think there is an opportunity cost in having fish being eaten at your house by your family? 
 
Monitoring –Quality and Standards: 
29. How do you keep your fish fresh? 
30. Do you take ice with you? 
31. What do you do with the fish at the end of the day? 
32. Do you air dry fish, smoke? 
33. Do you know how to preserve fish other than refrigeration? 
 
Selling Fish: 
34. Do you stand at the same place when you sell? 
35. What if there is another bakkie selling snoek at the space you use? 
36. Cash or credit and if on credit how do they repay you? 
37. Is it your own business or do you work for someone?  
38. What do you do when there is no snoek? 
39. Does the city monitor your activities in terms of health and hygienic requirements/standards? 
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40. What challenges do you face in your day to day activities in the fish selling business?  
41. Apart from selling fresh snoek, do you also sell smoked fish? 
42. What happens to the fish which is left unsold at the end of the day? 
43. What do you do with the fish that goes bad? 
 
Governance: 
44. Do you belong to any organization? 
45. How do you get information about the snoek, landings 
46. Do you know of the new small-scale fisheries policy? 
47. What do you think the authorities should do to promote small scale fish traders like you? 
48. Do you have a fishing right for snoek or does any of your family member have?  
49. Do you know of what is a permit, quota, rights? 
(a) Other (please specify) 
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees/Respondents 
Snoek Traders   
1. Irifaal Jacobs 
2. Moegamat Shakies Daniels 
3. Reagan van der Spuy 
4. Johan Visagie  
5. David Karstens 
6. Zuhair Albertyn 
7. Kurtlee Prins 
8. Derrick Swanepoel  
9. Piet Oostehuizen  
10. Ulrich Esbach 
11. Rushda Warner 
12. Jacob Coetzee 
13. Samuel Wulana 
14. Chantel Roberts 
15. Yvonne de Drieks  
16. Umuziwendoda Ngutyana 
17. Riaan Zuhair 
18. David Stevens 
19. Gert  van Wyk 
20. Christopher Hendricks 
 
World Wide fund for Nature South Africa  
1. Mkhululi Silandela Small Scale Fisheries Officer Market Transformation 
2. Alice Johnson Programm Officer – Fisheries and Aquaculture 
 
Fishers and skippers  
1. Jody Malgus 
2. Simon Erasmus 
3. John Goosens  
4. Colin Smith  
 
Irvine & Johnson 
1. Denis Handley 
2. Anthony 
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DAFF 
1. Christopher Gerald Wilke - Scientific Technician Control Grade B: Inshore Resources; 
Linefish Section, Fisheries Management; Chief Directorate: Research and Development: 
Directorate: Research. 
2. Saasa Pheeha Director: Offshore and High Seas Fisheries Management at Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.  
3. Cobus de Swardt Deputy Director: Business Economics Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry & Fisheries (DAFF) Branch: Fisheries Management  
 
Line fish Association 
1. Wally Croome - Chair of the SA Commercial Linefish Association 
 
 
 
 
 
